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Abstract
The goal of this thesis is twofold. First, for a rather broad class of fi-
nancial options a stochastic model predictive control (SMPC) approach is
proposed for dynamically hedging a portfolio of underlying assets. After
formulating the dynamic hedging problem as a stochastic control problem
with a least-squares criterion, for plain vanilla and exotic options we test
its ability to replicate the payoff at expiration date. We show not only that
relatively small hedging errors are obtained in spite of price realizations,
but also that the approach is robust with respect to market modeling errors.
The SMPC approach is then extended to hedging derivative contracts (such
as plain vanilla and exotic options) in the presence of transaction costs.
After proving that the least-squares approach is no longer suitable to han-
dle this kind of market, the hedging performance obtained by three different
measures is tested and compared in simulation on a European call and a
barrier option. The aim in the second part of this thesis is to present a
novel market design for trading energy and regulating reserves and to intro-
duce a strategy for the optimal bidding problem in such a scenario. In the
deregulated market, the presence of several market participants or Balance
Responsible Parties (BRPs) entitled for trading energy, together with the
increasing integration of renewable sources and price-elastic loads, shift the
focus on decentralized control and reliable forecast techniques. The main
feature of the considered market design is its double-sided nature. In addi-
tion to portfolio-based supply bids and based on prediction of their stochas-
iii
tic production and load, BRPs are allowed to submit risk-limiting requests.
Requesting capacity from the AS market corresponds to giving to the mar-
ket an estimate of the possible deviation from the daily production schedule
resulting from the day-ahead auction and from bilateral contracts, named
E-Program. In this way each BRP is responsible for the balanced and safe
operation of the electric grid. On the other hand, at each Program Time
Unit (PTU) BRPs must also offer their available capacity under the form
of bids. In this paper, a bidding strategy to the double-sided market is de-
scribed, where the risk is minimized and all the constraints are fulfilled. The
algorithms devised are tested in a simulation environment and compared to
the current practice, where the double-sided auction is not contemplated.
Results in terms of expected imbalances and reliability are presented.
Keywords
[Stochastic, Optimization, Hedging, Bidding, Electricity Markets]
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The origin of stock trading dates back as far as the 16th century in Bel-
gium, where brokers and moneylenders used to meet to deal in business,
government and individual debt issues, even though the only products ac-
tually traded were promissory notes and bonds. A more evolved prototype
of stock exchange burst out during colonialism, when investors were eager
to have part of the huge profits coming from the East Indies. They often
lent money to ship owners undertaking long and dangerous sea trips to
obtain dividends in return. The exchange of stocks, issued on paper with-
out any regulation, grew so quickly and disorderly that it inevitably led
to a crash, when the South Sea Company (SSC) was unable to pay off the
dividends to the investors.
Since then, stock exchanges regulated by governments were formed all
over the world, the most important of them being the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). The number and variety of the stocks traded on stock
markets has developed tremendously without interruptions, and more and
more sophisticated financial products have been created to redistribute the
risk borne by investors.
Among the uncountable types of contracts arisen in the last decades, the
1
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group of financial derivatives, products whose value derives from the value
of other stocks traded on the market, is one of the most known and con-
troversial. Financial derivatives have spread all over the world due to the
market globalization and to the introduction of automatic pricing. They
are often associated with the subprime crisis in 2008, that stemming from
the mortgage industry also affected the global credit market. However, if
utilized consciously and with carefulness, derivatives can be a good tool
for investors who want to limit their risk.
A wide class of derivatives, the options, can be seen as a bet on the future
evolution of some quantities observable on financial markets. The option
assigns a value, called payoff to each realization of the observed variables,
which in general are called underlying assets. Financial institutions selling
those contracts try to replicate the evolution of the option by managing a
dynamic portfolio, consisting of simpler stocks or cash, in order to ensure
they will be able to pay off the real value of the option to the investor
at the expiration date. The most widespread and studied options are the
plain vanilla options: a call (put) gives the owner the right to buy (sell)
a given asset (the underlying) on a predetermined expiration date at an
agreed price, called strike price. A financial institution treating options
faces two main problems:
1. determining the initial price at which to sell the contracts;
2. designing a dynamic strategy for the portfolio management, whose
initial value is the price at which the option was sold, indicating how
to change its composition in order to hedge against the risk.
Such strategy has to make the replicating portfolio as close as possible to
the option payoff, independently of the price of the underlying.
The hedging problem can be cast as an optimal control problem that
given an initial condition, namely the value of the portfolio or the option
2
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price, aims at minimizing the difference between the final portfolio value
and the option payoff, eliminating the effects of price uncertainty as much
as possible. In the last years a new research line has been developing, which
applies well known results of the linear feedback control theory in a portfo-
lio management context [12, 14, 36, 55–57, 64, 65]. One of the possible tools
that can be borrowed from control theory for the stock trading problem is
Model Predictive Control (MPC). This suboptimal method solves at each
sampling time an open loop optimization problem over a finite prediction
horizon, based on a model of the system to be controlled. Note that if we
allow the prediction horizon to be infinite, we would obtain the real optimal
control scheme for the system. After the optimization problem is solved
and a sequence of control moves is obtained, only the first move is actually
implemented, while the remaining moves are discarded. The optimization
is repeated at the next sample time, when the actual state of the system
is updated based on the latest information available on the system. One
limitation of MPC is that it does not provide a specific strategy to deal
with uncertainty. It assumes that the prediction model is exact and ne-
glects possible disturbances. For this reason the stochastic version of MPC
is often used: in Stochastic MPC (or SMPC), the function describing the
time evolution of the system is not deterministic but stochastic, the state
variables are therefore associated with a probability distribution.
Since the liberalization of energy markets, electricity can be deemed as
another type of tradable asset. Traditionally, it was general belief that
all the phases of the electricity supply chain, from generation to distri-
bution, had to be controlled in a centralized way to ensure reliable and
efficient operations. However, since the late nineties the liberalization of
electricity markets started to be implemented in many European countries,
especially after the Directive 96/92/EC, which came into force in 1997 es-
tablishing common rules for the internal market, in particular concerning
3
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the generation, transmission and distribution of electricity and separating
the monopoly elements of the business from the potentially competitive
segments. England and Wales were the first to implement the liberalized
market [33] followed by Norway in 1991, Sweden in 1995, Finland in 1997,
Spain and Germany in 1999. Of course, the introduction of liberalized mar-
kets led to higher risks for energy supply companies. An overview of the
stochastic models dealing with prices risks in liberalized electricity markets
is given in [59].
Although electricity can be traded in a similar way as stocks at power ex-
changes, there are major differences between traditional and financial mar-
kets like lacking liquidity, high volatility, non-normal distributions, market
incompleteness. According to [77], wholesale markets for electricity are
inherently incomplete and imperfectly competitive due to two main char-
acteristics of electrical power; power is a flow of energy that cannot be
monitored perfectly, and storing electrical energy in large quantities in-
volves high costs. Market flaws are mostly related to inadequate design
of operational rules, structural and architectural problems. The way mar-
ket operators behave on the electricity market differ among the various
countries, and are strongly related to the market design and regulatory
framework they operate in. In general, electricity markets are divided into
four categories: forward markets, where long term bilateral contracts are
issued, day-ahead markets, that can be deemed as the wholesale market
for energy, intraday markets where market operators can adjust their po-
sition by correcting/withdrawing offers and requests and finally ancillary
services markets, where additional services like emergency power and regu-
lating capacity are offered and bought to the grid for the real-time balance
of the system. A well-designed market architecture must ensure the correct
and reliable operation of the power system, as well as the fairness in prices
and tariffs. Efficient architectures must discourage market participants to
4
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deviate from their scheduled power generation and consumption. To this
aim, market entities with regulating functions are in place. In particular,
the Transmission System Operator is responsible for the system security
and must guarantee that the correct amount of reserve power is allocated
for the safe operation of the system.
The energy market is going through a period of transition. On the one
hand the liberalization gave everyone the opportunity for an equal and fair
access to the grid; small-size producers and end-users of electricity gained
importance, also thanks to new technologies like smart meters and sen-
sors, by which they can regulate consumption and production based on
the state of the network. Renewable sources also play an important role in
the achievement of the ambitious targets set by the European Commission
on greenhouse gases emissions and energy consumption reduction. On the
other hand however, these elements form a complex scenario consisting
of numerous interrelated (and often stochastic) variables and the need for
new control structures and market architectures emerges. Market opera-
tors entitled to trade energy are often called Balance Responsible Parties
(BRPs). While participating to the market BRPs need supporting tools
in their complex decision processes, from the market level to real-time op-
erations, in order to be able to exploit the information coming from the
outside world at their best, and to hedge against risks.
1.2 Goal and purpose
The goal of this thesis is to present optimization-based tools for trading
on financial and energy markets. More precisely, the first part focuses on
Stochastic MPC applied to dynamic hedging of derivatives with and with-
out transaction costs, while the second part is related to bidding strategies
on double-sided energy markets, i.e. markets where transactions are bidi-
5
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rectional (energy can be bought or sold by everyone).
Analogies and differences between the energy markets and the standard
tradable products like stocks and options are investigated, and appropriate
techniques are proposed and discussed to tackle these two different families
of assets with particular focus on risk management.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The topic of the first part is
hedging of financial derivatives on stock markets. Chapters 2 and 3 are
introductive chapters on the main mathematical tools and risk measures
used in this thesis. More specifically, in Chapter 2 the concept of risk is
introduced and the main financial risk measures are defined, while Chapter
3 contains a short overview of Model Predictive Control (MPC) techniques
and its stochastic variant SMPC. Chapter 4 is the central section of this
first part, and focuses on dynamic option hedging. The problem is tackled
with SMPC techniques based on the minimum variance criterion (in case
of frictionless markets) and on three different objective functions when
transaction costs are applied.
The second part of the thesis deals with trading strategies in the liberal-
ized electricity market, focusing on the market behavior of BRPs (balance
responsible parties). In particular, Chapter 5 describes the main tasks
tackled by energy market operators in current market designs, with a par-
ticular focus on the Dutch situation, and presents a new architecture for
double-sided ancillary services markets devised in the European project E-
Price1. In Chapter 6 a strategy to bid on this kind of market is proposed,
based on the minimization of a risk function. Mathematical modeling and
formulations of the bidding problems are given, and a case study related
1E-Price: Price- based Control of Electrical Power Systems.
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to the project simulation environment is analyzed. Finally, in Chapter 7
some conclusions are presented.
1.4 Publications
Chapter 4 is based on the following publications:
• A. Bemporad, T. Gabbriellini, L. Puglia, L. Bellucci, Scenario-based
Stochastic Model Predictive Control for Dynamic Option Hedging, in
Proc. 49-th Conference on Decision and Control, Atlanta, GA, 2010
• A. Bemporad, L. Puglia, A Stochastic Model Predictive Control Ap-
proach to Dynamic Option Hedging with Transaction Costs, in Proc.
American Control Conference, San Francisco, CA, 2011
A journal version of the last conference paper has been submitted for re-
view:
• A. Bemporad, L. Puglia, T. Gabbriellini, Stochastic Model Predictive
Control for Dynamic Option Hedging with Transaction Costs, Applied
Mathematical Sciences, submitted for review on October 25, 2012
Chapter 5 is largely based on the following publication:
• A. Jokic, P.P.J. van den Bosch, A. Virag, W.H.A. Hendrix, L. Puglia,
W. de Boer, R. Vujanic, F. Nobel, Reliability and Efficiency at Global
Level in Power Systems, in Proc. 10th International Conference on
the European Energy Markets, Stockholm, Sweden, 2013
Chapter 6 is based on the conference paper:
• L.Puglia, A. Jokic, A. Virag. A. Bemporad, Double-sided ancillary
services markets: design and optimal bidding strategies, in Proc. 10-
th International Conference on the European Energy Markets, Stock-
holm, Sweden, 2013
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the project proposes a price-based control approach as a coherent 
methodological framework to ensure the feasibility, the reliability and 
the efficiency of the future european power system, anticipate and 
support market-based operation and decentralized decision making. 
it is enabled by state-of-the-art ict technologies and by utilizing (be-
yond-) state-of-the-art decentralized and distributed control systems 
theory and modern optimization techniques. in our approach, ict 
interfaces, control laws and behavioural protocols will be holistically 
analyzed and systematically designed as distributed solutions to 
time-varying global optimization problems.
in the e-Price project we propose a systematic scientific approach 
concePt
to formulate ict and control requirements and solutions for price-
based control of future power systems. at the heart of our approach 
are modelling, analysis and synthesis of the interplays between:
the interconnected physical power system (c and d in figure), 1. 
with time varying power requirements as prominent signals; 
and the economical layer (a and b in figure) with time varying 
price signals as the prominent information carriers;
local objectives of producers/consumers (prosumers) (b and c 2. 
in figure) and global balance, transmission network limits and 
reliability constraints (a and d in figure).
GLOBAL LOCAL
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Y
S
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S
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L D C
Global physical constraints > Prices Prices > Power, Energy, Reserve Capacity
Interfaces; time-varying price signals
Prosumers
Transmission
network
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O
N
O
M
Y
R
EL
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B
IL
TY A B
Market agents
Markets
Sys. operator
e-Price  enabling the future energy system
Figure 1.1: The E-Price concept
1.5 The E-Price project
The research presen ed in the second p rt of thi th is has been carried
out within the framework of the European project “E-Price - Price-based
Control of Electrical Power systems”, FP7-IST contract no. 249096.
The main motivation of E-Price stems from the technological and so-
cietal developments arisen over recent decades encouraging the use of an
increasing quantity of renewable energy sources (wind, solar) for the pro-
duction of electric energy. People are starting to generate their own en-
ergy, becoming producers themselves. At the same time the predictability
of both production and consumption of electric energy is decreasing, in-
troducing larger imbalances in the electricity network. The current energy
production system inadequately copes with this unpredictability and will
soon reach the limit for secure and reliable operation.
E-Price is a three-year European research project aiming to develop
a reliable, an efficient and a societally-acceptable control concept for the
EU energy market. E-Price sets a new standard by introducing a feasible
price-based control strategy. Four academic and five industrial partners
are involved in the project.
The aim of E-Price is to offer an integral solution as the standard frame-
8
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work for trade in electrical energy, satisfying European Union policy goals.
This will bring about a market and control concept that gives incentives
to all participants to follow their own interests while still satisfying the
societal requirements on reliability, efficiency and transparency.
The project proposes the price-based control approach as a coherent
methodological framework to ensure the feasibility, the reliability and the
efficiency of the future European power system, anticipate and support
market based operation and decentralized decision making. It is enabled
by state-of-the-art ICT technologies and by utilizing (beyond-) state-of-
the-art decentralized and distributed control systems theory and modern
optimization techniques.
In the E-Price project we propose a systematic scientific approach to
formulate ICT and control requirements and solutions for price-based con-
trol of future power systems. In the heart of our approach are modeling,
analysis and synthesis of the interplays between:
• the interconnected physical power system (C and D in figure 1.1),
with time varying power requirements as prominent signals; and the
economical layer (A and B in figure 1.1) with time varying price signals
as the prominent information carriers.
• Local objectives of producers/consumers (prosumers) (B and C in fig-
ure 1.1) and global balance, transmission network limits and reliability
constraints (A and D in figure 1.1).
The research reported in this thesis deals with the interconnection be-
tween A and B in figure 1.1, that is, with the economical optimization of
market agents behavior.
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1.6 Basic notation
Let R, R+, Z and Z+ respectively denote the field of real numbers, non-
negative real numbers, integers and nonnegative integers. For a matrix
A ∈ Rm×n, [Aij] denotes the element in the i-th row and j-th column.
The transpose of a matrix A is denoted by A′. Positive and semi-positive
definiteness of a matrix A are denoted respectively by A  0 and A  0.
We use In and 1In to indicate the identity matrix of dimension n×n and a
column vector of n ones. The floor function b·c of a ∈ R is used to define
the largest b ∈ Z such that a ≥ b. The operators [f(x)]+ = max{0, f(x)}
and [f(x)]− = min{0, f(x)} for a function f : Rn → R define respectively
the positive and negative part of a function. Finally, we denote by E[X]
the expected value of a random variable X and by Var(X) its variance.
We use E[X|Y ] and Var(X|Y ) to define the conditional expectation and
variance of X given Y = y.
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Chapter 2
Risk management in financial and
energy markets
Risk management is the identification, assessment and prioritization of
risk, followed by appropriate control measures aimed to eliminate, or more
often reduce, the probability or impact of unfortunate events. The risks
that a firm can encounter can originate from a multitude of causes, for
example the uncertainty of financial markets, credit risks, project failures,
natural disasters or unknown and unforeseeable events. The strategies used
to counteract risk typically include transferring the risk to another party,
or avoiding the threat, reducing the possible impact of a negative event or
even accepting the risk to some reasonable extent.
The most important types of risk that companies face on standard fi-
nancial markets are:
• Credit risk: the risk that a borrower goes into default and is therefore
not able to pay an obligation;
• Liquidity risk: the risk that a good or stock cannot be traded quickly
enough to prevent a loss;
• Market risk: the risk that some quantity on the market, such as
stock prices, interest rates or commodity prices will change;
11
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• Operational risk: is the risk associated with human errors, system
failures and inadequate procedures and resulting in unexpected losses;
Moreover, there are other types of risk more specific to the trading of
electricity on the market, such as:
• Volume risk: a type of risk frequently faced by firms operating on
electricity markets, related to the fact that they often do not know
the exact amount of energy to be delivered or produced at a given
time instant;
• Basis risk: the risk that the ratio between the prices of two traded
commodities, for example fuel and electricity, will change;
• Physical risk: the risk that electricity is not delivered at the con-
tracted time and location due to various problems affecting the grid
connections, like transmission lines overflows or outages;
• Regulatory and political risk: changes in the regulatory and po-
litical framework can affect seriously the trading activity of a firm.
2.1 Risk measures
When performing risk management, the first step is to quantify the risk.
Therefore, the need for an appropriate and coherent risk measure emerges.
A first empirical approach to simply assess the effect of uncertainty is the
stress test. One or more possible realizations of the uncertain variables (for
example, a 30% shift in the fuel price) are hypothesized and the effect of
such events are measured. The advantage of this approach is its simplicity,
but one cannot exclude a more reliable and strict mathematical assessment
when performing a thorough risk management activity. In the following
sections the most common measures for risk are examined.
12
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2.1.1 Variance
The most traditional risk measure is variance, quantifying the dispersion
of the uncertain variables. Minimizing variance is equivalent to minimize
the portfolio dispersion around the expected value. The standard mean-
variance Markovitz problem [54] is the following:
min
x
xTΣx (2.1)
s.t. Ax = r (2.2)
where Σ ∈ Rn×n is the covariance matrix in a portfolio of n assets, r ∈ Rn
is a vector of expected returns and x ∈ Rn is the position in each asset
composing the portfolio. The aim is to minimize the variance of a portfolio,
with the requirement that a minimum expected return is obtained. By
construction, Σ is a positive definite matrix and the linear constraint (2.2)
defines a convex set. Therefore, a solution to the Markowitz problem exists
and it is unique.
In the mean-variance approach if the investor has a quadratic objective
function regardless of the probability distribution of the underlying assets
only the first two moments are relevant. This strategy is therefore not well
suited for the case of very skewed and asymmetric distributions like the
ones characterizing energy markets.
2.1.2 Value at Risk
In the late eighties, partly triggered by the stock market crisis of 1987, a
new downside-risk measure was introduced, namely Value at Risk (VaR).
This measure was thought as an attempt to quantify the risk of extreme
events from measurements of everyday price movements.
Let f(u, s) : Rn+k → R be a loss function associated with the decision
vector u ∈ Rn and with the random vector s ∈ Rk. Let p(s) be the
13
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probability density function of s. With respect to a given probability β,
0 ≤ β ≤ 1, the β-VaR (Value at Risk) is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.1 VaR with confidence level β of the loss associated with
a decision variable u is the value
`β = inf{` ∈ R : f(u, `) ≥ β} (2.3)
In other words, VaR is the lowest value `β, such that, with probability
β, the loss will not exceed `β. The number β is a fixed value, typically
β = 90%, 95%, or 99%. The main criticism moved against VaR is that the
amount of loss occurring with probability (1−β) is not taken into account
directly. VaR is not capable to differentiate between large and very large
losses, and moreover it lacks sub-additivity, that is, VaR of the combination
of two portfolios can be higher than the sum of the risks of the individual
portfolios, thus contradicting the diversification principle. To avoid these
inconveniences, another asymmetric risk measure strictly related to VaR,
β-CVaR, was introduced.
2.1.3 Conditional Value at Risk
Conditional Value at Risk β-CVaR is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1.2 CVaR with confidence level β of the loss associated with
a decision variable u is the value
φβ(u) = (1− β)−1
∫
f(u,s)≥`β
f(u, s)p(s)ds (2.4)
Conditional Value at Risk is the conditional expectation of the loss
function above `β, quantifying what the average loss is when one loses
more than `β, with probability 1 − β [71]. In [71] the authors show that
the β-CVaR of the loss associated with any u can be determined by the
14
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formula
φβ(u) = min
`∈R
Fβ(u, `) (2.5)
where
Fβ(u, `) = `+ (1− β)−1
∫
s∈Rm
[f(u, s)− `]+p(s)ds (2.6)
where [·]+ denotes the positive part of its argument, [f ]+ = max{f, 0}. The
integral in (2.6) can be approximated by sampling the probability distri-
bution of s according to its probability density function p(s). If [s1, . . . , sq]
is a sample vector of the random variable s, then the corresponding ap-
proximation of Fβ(`) is
F˜β(`) = `+
1
q(1− β)
q∑
k=1
[f(u, sk)− `]+ (2.7)
The expression F˜β(`) is convex and piecewise linear with respect to ` and
it can readily be minimized.
15
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Chapter 3
Model Predictive Control
Predictive control techniques were born around 1970 and they have the
scope of determining the control signal to feed into a system, minimizing
a given objective function. The acronym MPC encloses the three main
elements of predictive control:
• Model: a mathematical model of the system is needed to predict fu-
ture evolutions of the system state and output. The output measured
at the current instant depends on past values of the output and state,
besides the control action (causality).
• Predictive: optimization is based on the prediction of the future
evolution of the system.
• Control: the goal is to find a control law of a complex system.
The common strategy used to build a predictive controller is the follow-
ing:
1. a time horizon N is fixed, then future values of the system output over
that horizon are predicted using the model at disposal: y(t+k|t), k =
1, . . . , N . The value of y depends on past values of input and output
and on future input values: u(t+ k|t), k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
17
Figure 3.1: The receding horizon philosophy
2. The set of future control signals is evaluated optimizing a performance
index in order to keep the process as close as possible to a given
reference signal r(t+ k).
3. The control signal u(t|t) is fed into the process, the remaining control
signals u(t+k|t), k = 1, . . . , N−1 are discarded. This concept is called
receding horizon philosophy : the signal u(t+ 1|t) is discarded because
at the next sampling instant the output value y(t + 1) is known, the
new information coming from updated measurements can be used to
start again from step 1 and repeat the optimization.
The described control strategy can be schematized by Figure 3.1
If the model is linear, the optimization problem is quadratic (QP) if
the objective function is in l2 form, it is otherwise linear if the objective
function is in l1 or l∞. For example, if we chose a quadratic objective
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function, the MPC controller should solve at each time instant a problem
like this over an N time horizon:
min
ut...ut+N−1
N−1∑
k=0
|yt+k − r(t)|2 + ρ |ut+k − ur(t)|2 (3.1a)
s.t. xt+k+1 = f(xt+k, ut+k) (3.1b)
yt+k = g(xt+k, ut+k) (3.1c)
umin ≤ ut+k ≤ umax (3.1d)
ymin ≤ yt+k ≤ ymax (3.1e)
xt = x(t), k = 0, . . . , N − 1 (3.1f)
where (3.1a) describes the objective function to be minimized, (3.1b) rep-
resents the dynamic evolution of the system, (3.1c) indicate the system
output and (3.1d)-(3.1e) are input and output constraints.
3.1 Stochastic MPC
The classical MPC approach does not provide a real strategy to deal with
uncertainties; it assumes that the model is exact and perfectly representing
the reality. Robustness with respect to modeling errors or external distur-
bances can be handled with a min-max approach, where the performance
index is calculated over the worst case scenario. However, controllers op-
erating at nominal conditions often obtain poor performance, while robust
approaches result in too conservative control laws [70].
The stochastic version of MPC, Stochastic MPC (SMPC), developed
recently, exploiting the statistical information about system disturbances,
aimed to minimize the expected value of the performance index. SMPC
formulation is based on a maximum likelihood approach, where a scenario
tree is built at each time step, using all the available information on the
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state of the system. Each node of the tree represents a scenario, appro-
priately weighted in the optimization problem. Starting from the root
node, a series of candidate nodes are generated, each node corresponding
to a possible realization of the prediction model. A given stochastic opti-
mization index is minimized, for example based on the expected value or
variance, then a series of optimal moves are obtained, starting from the
current instant up to the prediction horizon. Exploiting the receding hori-
zon philosophy, only the first move is applied, the state is updated at the
following step and the optimization is repeated.
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Hedging of financial derivatives
This chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.1 the main derivatives
traded on financial markets are presented and described, with particular fo-
cus on options. Section 4.2 contains an overview of the literature on option
hedging and trading. In section 4.3 the mathematical models describing
the evolution of the assets over time and the option payoffs are formulated.
In section 4.4 the hedging problem will be formulated as a stochastic op-
timization problem and solved by means of MPC techniques. Simulation
results are given with respect to simple plain vanillas and Napoleon/barrier
options. In section 4.5 the hedging problem is extended to the case of trans-
action costs. Three alternative stochastic formulations of the problem are
given and simulation results are reported as well. Finally, some conclusions
are drawn in section 4.6.
4.1 Derivatives
Derivatives are financial instruments that are linked to other financial in-
struments or indicators or commodities, and through which financial risks
can be traded ([41]). The value of a financial derivative derives from the
price of an underlying item, such as an asset or index. Unlike debt instru-
ments, little or none capital investment is required, and they are regulated
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at a future date. Generally speaking, derivatives can be used for three
main reasons:
• speculation: consists of buying or selling a product with the aim to
obtain short-term profits, exploiting one’s vision of the market trend;
• arbitrage: consists of settling a risk-free profit by simultaneously en-
tering opposite positions in two different markets exploiting their im-
perfect nature;
• hedging : a strategy by which firms try to decrease the risk linked to
other financial activities, like price fluctuations of other assets.
Various types of derivatives exist and new arise every day and with any
kind of underlying, such as weather conditions or raw materials prices. In
relation to the type of contract, derivatives might be:
• forwards and futures : fixed term contracts by which firms exchange
an asset (goods, financial instruments, indices or foreign currencies)
on a future date at a fixed price;
• swap: contracts by which firms commit themselves to exchange cash
flows according to a specified scheme;
• options : contracts giving the owner (holder) the right to buy (call
option) or sell (put option) the underlying asset at a determined price
(strike price) on a given date (European option) or within a certain
date (American option). The fixed date is called expiration date or
expiry.
Derivatives can be traded either on regulated markets, with standard rules
concerning prices and conditions, or by specifying ad hoc terms between
the two parties, in that case we talk about Over The Counter transactions
(OTC).
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Figure 4.1: Payoff as a function of the underlying price at expiration for plain vanilla
options
The derivatives treated in this thesis are the options. The main dif-
ference distinguishing options from the other derivatives is that they do
not state any obligation for the owner (or holder) of the contract, who can
decide whether to exercise her right or not based on the market conditions.
The person selling the option (writer) has instead the obligation to deliver
the contracted asset on time, if required by the holder.
4.1.1 Plain Vanilla options
The simplest and most widespread options in circulation are called plain
vanilla. A call option gives the right to buy a given asset at an agreed
price. Generally one buys a call option if she expects the price of the
underlying to go higher than the strike price, while who writes the option
usually expects the price to decrease below the strike price. A call option
is exercised if the underlying price exceeds the strike price. Indicating by
s the stock price and by K the strike price, the value of the option at the
expiration date T is max{s(T )−K, 0}. This value is called payoff.
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A put option gives the holder the right to sell a given asset at a pre-
determined date. She is hoping that the price of the underlying will
decrease below the strike price. The payoff of a put option is given by
max{K − s(T ), 0}. Payoff function in relation to the final stock price for
plain vanilla options are shown in Figure 4.1. The value of the option at a
generic instant of its life t is called intrinsic value. The right to exercise the
option has a cost, called premium. The holder of the option is said to be in
a long positions, while the writer is said to be in a short position. Options
whose strike price is close to the underlying price are called At-the-money,
the ones whose intrinsic value is positive are called In-the-money, the ones
with negative intrinsic value are defined Out-of-the-money.
A variant of the plain vanilla options are the american options. The
holder of such an option can exercise her right at any time during the
option life. Finally, bermudan options provide the holder with a restricted
set of possible dates when the option can be exercised. Determining the
price of this kind of options is more difficult than for the plain vanilla ones.
4.1.2 Exotic options
The contracts described in the previous section are the simplest that can
be found on the market. Besides these, other types of options with much
more complicated payoffs are present, often showing a dependency on past
values of the underlying and not only at the exercise date; these options are
called exotic. If the option value depends on past values of the underlying
it is said to be path-dependent. Path dependency can be strong or weak.
Contracts with a strong path dependency have a payoff based on some
feature of the option underlying in the past, thus implying the impossibility
to derive the option payoff only based on the present value of the underlying
and time instant. For example, asian options depend on the mean value
of the underlying prior to expiry. This requires the introduction of an
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additional variable to describe the state of the system. On the contrary,
weak path dependency does not require an additional variable to describe
the option payoff. The simplest options showing this kind of dependency
are the barrier options, that are activated by the underlying achieving a
predefined boundary. The actual time instant and the underlying value
are still sufficient to describe the state of the system. Let us now briefly
examine the most common exotic options.
Barrier options
The payoff of these option is the same as plain vanilla options, conditioned
to the fact that the underlying has reached or not a given limit, called
barrier. More specifically, barrier options are defined as follows:
• knock-in: a payoff is obtained only if the barrier is reached by the
underlying. They are divided into:
– Down-and-In: the barrier is below the current value of the asset,
payoff is triggered at the achievement of this lower limit;
– Up-and-In: the barrier is above the current value of the asset,
payoff is triggered at the achievement of this upper limit.
• knock-out : pay a given payoff only if the barrier is not reached. They
can be split into:
– Down-and-Out : the barrier is below the underlying value, the
option looses its value if this lower limit is reached;
– Up-and-Out : the barrier is above the underlying value, the option
looses its value if this upper limit is reached.
For example, an Up-and-Out call with strike 100 e and barrier 120 e gives
the holder the same payoff of a call option, only if during the option life
the underlying does not reach the barrier.
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Asian options
Asian options have a payoff depending on the mean value of an underlying
asset over a given time period. As already mentioned, they are strongly
path dependent, since their value depends on the whole time path and not
only on the current state. Arithmetic or geometric mean can be used to
determine the current option payoff, and the mean can be calculated either
continuously, so considering all the values taken by the underlying, or more
simply by sampling the underlying realization at discrete time instants.
Lookback options
The payoff of this kind of options depends on the maximum and minimum
observed value of the underlying over a fixed period. For example a look-
back option can pay the holder with the difference between the maximum
and minimum value of the underlying. Also in this case maximum and
minimum value can be referred to the whole path or to a sample path.
Napoleon cliquet
The payoff of the Napoleon clique option is given by:
N + max
{
0, C + min
i∈{1,...,Nfix}
x(ti)− x(ti − 1)
x(ti − 1)
}
(4.1)
where N stands for nominal, C is a given percentage value called base
coupon and ti, i = 1, . . . , Nfix are fixing dates, that is, the set of dates when
the underlying is checked. In other words, the napoleon clique option pays
a percentage of the nominal value of the option (like an obligation), plus
a quantity given by the sum of the base coupon and the minimum return
o the title, if this quantity is positive.
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4.2 State of the art
For a financial institution, hedging a derivative contract implies maintain-
ing a self-financing portfolio of underlying assets, whose quantities need to
be readjusted periodically so that at the expiration date of the contract
the value of the portfolio is as close as possible to the payoff value to be
paid to the customer.
The most common approach used in practice to dynamically rebalancing
the portfolio replicating the option is delta hedging, which directly derives
from the fundamental theory of Black and Scholes [9], according to which
the portfolio includes a quantity of stocks equal to the derivative of the op-
tion price with respect to the price of the underlying stock. Delta hedging
makes the portfolio insensitive to the indeterministic evolution of the stock
price, under a series of (often unrealistic) hypotheses including continuous
hedging, static volatility, and the absence of transaction costs. When ap-
plied in a real market context, such assumptions may lead to intolerable
hedging errors.
The seminal works [9, 58] and their extensions to models with stochastic
volatility [38] aim at perfect hedging by eliminating the risk at each time
instant through a proper rebalancing of assets in the portfolio, usually con-
tinuously in time. Simulation is another method often used by investment
firms to price options [11, 39]. A (large) set of scenarios for the future
prices of the underlying assets is generated by Monte Carlo simulation; the
final value of the asset price of each scenario is used to compute the payoff
value; the average of such payoff values, discounted by the interest rate,
provides the option price. In view of such a current practice for option
pricing, in this thesis we focus our attention only on the hedging problem.
Approaches that instead look at the entire life of the option aim at min-
imizing risk at expiration date. The problem can be cast as a stochastic
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optimal control problem and rely on the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman partial
differential equation. This category includes multi-stage stochastic pro-
gramming approaches, in which the pricing and hedging problem is solved
as a stochastic linear programming problem [31, 47, 79]. The approach is
often limited by numerical reasons. In fact, the number of nodes in the tree
is exponential in the number of trading periods, which typically limits the
number of branches at each node to two or three. Stochastic dynamic pro-
gramming approaches [8, 24] also discretize the probability space and solve
the pricing and hedging problem backwards in time. While the method
is appealing, its main limitation is due to numerical explosion when the
number of trading periods is large and several assets are traded.
This thesis attacks the hedging problem from a feedback control view-
point and proposes stochastic model predictive control (SMPC) ideas [18,
60, 66] to design a dynamic hedging strategy. SMPC can be seen as a
suboptimal way of solving a stochastic multi-stage dynamic programming
problem: rather than solving the problem for the whole option-life horizon,
a smaller problem is solved repeatedly from the current time-step t up to
a certain number N of time steps in the future by suitably remapping the
condition at the expiration date into a value at time t + N . SMPC has
been proposed recently in financial applications, such as in [37] for port-
folio optimization, and in [3, 57] for option pricing and hedging. Other
approaches that look at automatic trading as a feedback control problem
were proposed in [2, 13].
In [64] dynamic hedging under transaction costs is performed from a
SMPC point of-view for a plain vanilla option. A finite horizon constrained
stochastic control problem is formulated and iteratively solved at each trad-
ing date by employing a semi-definite programming algorithm.
The contributions [25] and [31] proposed analytic methods based on
stochastic optimization to handle transaction costs. In [25] the option
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price and the optimal trading strategy are jointly determined that reduce
the total risk of writing the option. In [31] a trinomial process is used for
generating the scenarios required to setup a stochastic control problem, in
which the objective function is the expected value of a given performance
index.
In [65] the hedging problem is formulated as a linear quadratic reg-
ulation (LQR) problem with constraints and two methods are proposed
to cope with transaction costs. One involves penalizing transaction costs
in the objective function, so that the problem can be solved as an un-
constrained linear quadratic problem; the second method uses a model
predictive control approach to solve a quadratic program over a specified
horizon, exploiting the LQR solution from the first approach in the cost
function.
In this thesis we propose a novel SMPC approach to dynamic option
hedging based on a minimum variance criterion that requires a simple least-
squares optimization to evaluate the optimal trading moves, by extending
results proposed in [5]. To be able to handle very general stock price mod-
els and exotic payoffs, for which no analytic hedging policy exist, a pricing
engine is used on-line to generate a finite number of future scenarios of op-
tion prices, rather than analytically deriving expected values from pricing
models as in [37, 64]. To evaluate each option price, the pricing engine
employs either Monte Carlo simulation (on-line computations), or off-line
function approximation to approximate the option value as a function of
the state of the market (such as the price of the underlying stock), so that
on-line evaluation is very fast. We will then extend the SMPC approach
to option hedging to handle proportional transaction costs. After showing
that the minimum variance criterion is inadequate to handle transaction
costs, we propose three new different approaches to solve the dynamic
hedging problem via SMPC. The first is based on the scalarization of the
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multi-objective problem of minimizing both the variance and the expected
value of the hedging error; the second minimizes the Conditional Value at
Risk (CVaR) introduced in Chapter 2; the third is based on the minimiza-
tion of the maximum hedging error over the set of scenarios considered in
the stochastic optimization problem solved by the SMPC algorithm. The
three approaches lead to, respectively, a quadratic programming (QP), a
linear programming (LP), and a (smaller) LP problem to be solved at each
trading date. The three SMPC formulations are tested and compared,
among them and to delta hedging, on both plain vanilla and barrier exotic
options.
4.3 Model formulation
Consider the problem of hedging an option O defined over n underlying
assets, whose spot prices at time τ are si(τ), i = 1, . . . , n, satisfying the
stochastic differential equations in the real-world probability measure
dsi(τ) = µ
s
i (si(τ), yi(τ))dτ + σ
s
i (s(τ), y(τ))dz
s
i (4.2a)
dyi(τ) = µ
y
i (yi(τ))dτ + σ
y
i (y(τ))dz
y
i (4.2b)
where zsi (τ), z
y
i (τ) are Wiener processes, namely dz
s
i , dz
y
i are correlated
Gaussian variables with zero mean and variance dτ . In (4.2) we assume
si ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n, ∀τ ≥ 0. Model (4.2) is a rather general form that
covers several popular models, including the log-normal stock price model
dsi(τ) = (µdτ + σdzi)si(τ) (4.3)
where zi(τ) is a Wiener process, with zero mean and variance dτ . More
general models can be used to describe price dynamics, such as Heston’s
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model [38]:
dsi(τ) = (µ
s
idτ +
√
yi(τ)dz
s
i )si(τ) (4.4a)
dyi(τ) = θi(ki − yi(τ))dτ + ωi
√
yi(τ)dz
y
i (4.4b)
where (4.4b) is the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process [19] for the variance yi(τ),
and dzsi has correlation ρi with dz
y
i .
In this thesis, we focus on the log-normal model (4.3), whose discrete-
time equivalent form is
si(t+ 1) = e
(µ− 12σ2)∆T+σ
√
∆T zi(t)si(t) (4.5)
where t denotes the trading instant, t = 0, 1, . . ., and ∆T is the time
interval between two consecutive trading dates. We denote by s(t) =
[s1(t) . . . sn(t)]
′ ∈ Rn the overall vector of asset prices.
4.3.1 Option price and payoff function
We assume that the portfolio associated with option O is updated every
∆T units of time, and denote by T the maturity of O expressed in terms of
number of sampling steps. The payoff p(T ) of O is described by a function
P :
p(T ) = P(m(T )) (4.6)
of the state m(T ) of the considered asset market at expiration date, for
example m(T ) = x(T ). We denote by p(t) the price of the hedged option
at a generic intermediate time t∆T ,
p(t) = (1 + r)t−N E˜ [P(m(T ))|m(t)] (4.7)
where m(T ) is the state of the market at time t and P(m(T )) is the ex-
pected value of the payoff in the risk-neutral measure, given the market at
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time t. In (4.7) r = era∆T − 1 is the return of the risk free investment over
∆T , and ra is the annualized continuously compounded interest rate, which
we assume to be constant (Equation (4.7) can be also restated recursively
as p(t) = (1 + r)−1E˜[p(t + 1)|m(t)]). For instance, for a European call
option on a single stock s with strike price K, we have
p(T ) = max{s(T )−K, 0} (4.8)
m(t) = {s(t), y(t)}, and p(t) = e−r(N−t)E˜ [max{s(T )−K, 0}|s(t), y(t)]. In
particular, for log-normal price models, m(t) = s(t). For “Napoleon cli-
quet” path-dependent exotic options
p(T ) = max
{
0, C + min
i∈{1,...,Nfix}
s(ti)− s(ti−1)
s(ti−1)
}
(4.9)
where ti, i = 1, . . . , Nfix are the fixing dates, and C is a fixed value. In this
case m(t) = {s(t0), . . . , s(tk), s(t), y(t)}, where k is the fixing index such
that tk ≤ t < tk+1. For weak path-dependent “Barrier” exotic options
p(T ) =
{
max(s(T )−K, 0) if s(t) < su, ∀t ≤ T
0 otherwise
=
{
max(s(T )−K, 0) if s`(t) = 0
0 if s`(t) = 1
(4.10)
where su define the upper barrier level, and s`(t) ∈ {0, 1} is a logic state
with dynamics s`(t + 1) = s`(t) OR [s(t) ≥ su], s`(0) = 0. In this case
m(t) = {s(t), s`(t), y(t)}.
4.3.2 Portfolio dynamics
Assume that there are no transaction costs, and that the standard self-
financing condition holds, i.e., that the wealth w(t) of the portfolio repli-
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cating option O is always totally reinvested. Then, the dynamics of the
wealth w(t) of the portfolio is
w(t+ 1) = (1 + r)w(t) +
n∑
i=1
bi(t)ui(t) (4.11)
where ui(t) is the quantity of asset i held at time t and bi(t) , si(t +
1) − (1 + r)si(t) is the excess return, i.e., how much the asset gains (or
loses) with respect to the risk-free rate. The initial condition w(0) is set
equal to the price paid by the customer to purchase option O, w(0) =
(1 + r)−N E˜[p(T )|m(0)].
4.4 Stochastic MPC formulation
Dynamic hedging aims at making the final wealth w(T ) as close as possi-
ble to p(T ) for all possible market realizations. The hedging problem can
be restated as a stochastic control problem, where the wealth w(t) ∈ R
represents the state and output of the regulated process, the traded as-
set quantities u(t) ∈ Rn are the inputs, the option price p(t) the target
reference for w(t). By defining the tracking error e(t) , w(t) − p(t), the
objective can be restated as the one of minimizing e(t) for all possible asset
price realizations. This can be achieved by minimizing the variance of the
hedging error.
J(e(T )) = E
[
(e(T )− E[e(T )])2] (4.12)
by solving the one-step ahead minimum-variance problem
min
{u(t)}
Varmt+1 [w(t+ 1,mt+1)− p(t+ 1,mt+1)] (4.13a)
s.t. w(t+ 1,mt+1) = (1 + r)w(t)
+
n∑
i=0
bi(t,mt+1)ui(t) (4.13b)
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with respect to the portfolio composition u(t) at each trading date t∆T .
Note that expectations and variances are conditioned to the particular
market realization mt at time t; we omit here the conditional notation for
simplicity. Since now on we will use the notation w(t+ 1) as a shortcut for
the future wealth w(t+1,mt+1). The formulation in (4.13) is equivalent to a
stochastic model predictive control approach with prediction horizon N =
1, under the terminal condition of perfect hedging between prediction time
t+N and expiration date T . Problem (4.13) can be solved by enumerating
a number M of scenarios, each one corresponding to a different realization
of a certain sequence of prices, and optimize the resulting sample variance.
Each scenario j has probability pij of occurring, j = 1, . . . ,M , pij > 0, pij ≤
1,
∑M
k=1 pij = 1. Scenarios can be generated via Monte Carlo simulation [5],
where pij = 1M , or by discretizing a given probability density function that
describes the disturbance process zi(t) [6]. Assuming that zi(t) follows
a Gaussian normal distribution pi(z) = 1√
2pi
e−
1
2z
2
, for a fixed set of limit
values zj, j = 0, . . . ,M , z0 = −∞, zM = +∞, we obtain:
pij =
∫ z¯j+1
z¯j
pi(z)dz =
1
2
(
erf
(
z¯j+1√
2
)
− erf
(
z¯j√
2
))
(4.14)
sj(t+ 1) =
1
pij
∫ z¯j+1
z¯j
s(z)pi(z)dz
= s(t)
k1
pij
e
k2
2
∫ z¯j+1−k2
z¯j−k2
1√
2pi
e−
1
2v
2
dv
= s(t)
k1
2pij
e
k2
2
(
erf
(
z¯j+1 − k2√
2
)
− erf
(
z¯j − k2√
2
))
(4.15)
pj(t+ 1) =
1
pij
∫ z¯j+1
z¯j
p(t+ 1,m(z))pi(z)dz
≈ p(t+ 1,m(z¯j+1)) + p(t+ 1,m(z¯j))
2pij(z¯j+1 − z¯j) (4.16)
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Where k1 = e
µ− 12σ2∆t, k2 = σ
√
∆t, s(z) = s(t)k1e
k2z, and m(z) is the
market state of the asset.
Note that, contrarily to multi-stage stochastic programming approaches
that typically limit the number M of considered scenarios to only 2 or 3 to
avoid the combinatorial explosion over the optimization horizon N , here M
can be quite large without incurring into prohibitive computation efforts,
as the prediction horizon is simply N = 1.
By optimizing the sample variance of w(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1), in the absence
of transaction costs problem (4.13) can be rewritten as the following least
squares problem
min
u(t)
M∑
j=1
pij
(
wj(t+ 1)− pj(t+ 1)−
(
1
M
M∑
i=1
wi(t+ 1)− pi(t+ 1)
))2
(4.17)
where wj(t + 1) = (1 + r)w(t) +
∑n
i=0 b
j
i (t)ui(t) are the future values of
portfolio wealth for each scenario j = 1, . . . ,M , and pij is the correspond-
ing probability, pij ≥ 0, ∑Mi=1 pij = 1. The resulting SMPC algorithm is
described by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 SMPC algorithm for dynamic option hedging
1. Let t=current hedging date, w(t)= current wealth of portfolio, m(t)=current market state;
2. Generate M scenarios of future market states m1(t+ 1), . . ., mM (t+ 1), with corresponding probabilities
pi1, . . . , piM ;
3. Use a pricing engine to generate the corresponding future option prices p1(t+ 1), . . ., pM (t+ 1);
4. Solve the least square problem (4.17) to minimize the sample variance of w(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1);
5. Rebalance the portfolio according of the optimal solution u∗(t) of problem (4.17);
6. End.
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4.4.1 Pricing future option values
An option pricing engine is needed at step 2. of Algorithm 1 to compute the
future option prices p1(t + 1), . . ., pM(t + 1) over the generated scenarios,
which may be a bottleneck of the proposed SMPC approach for exotic
options. Several approaches exist to option pricing, such as those based on
Monte Carlo simulation. If each option evaluation requires the simulation
of L scenarios, then one has to simulate ML paths on-line at each trading
period t to build the optimization problem (4.17), which may be a time
consuming task.
Although advanced techniques exist for parallel computation of Monte
Carlo simulations, alternative off-line function approximation techniques
can be used to obtain option prices for each future scenario. The idea
is to construct a function that returns the option price as a function of
m(t) (that is, of the current asset parameters and of other option-related
quantities). In this thesis we use a function approximation inspired by the
Monte Carlo method of Longstaff and Schwartz [51] for pricing American
derivates, in which the continuation value (the option value at a future
date) is estimated by a regression of the discounted payoff on a base of
functions of some state variables. This methodology proved to have supe-
rior performance with respect to other classical general purpose function
approximation methods.
4.4.2 Simulation results
In this section we test the SMPC algorithm 1 on different options and asset
price models.
All simulation were performed on a Asus with 1.70 GHz Intel Pentium
R processor and 2 Gb RAM running MATLABTM R2007b under Windows
XP, using the following parameters: M = 100 scenarios (unless specified
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differently), prediction horizon N = 1, ∆T = 1 week is the time interval
between consecutive reallocations of the portfolio, T = 24 weeks is the ma-
turity of the option, ra = 4% is the annualized continuously compounded
interest rate so that r = e0.04
1
54 − 1 = 0.00074102 is the return of the risk
free investment over ∆T . In every example shown below the hedging strat-
egy is tested over Ns = 1000 simulations of randomly generated market
evolutions.
We will consider a single stock s1(t) with initial spot price s1(0) =
100 e. For European call options (4.8), we will consider the strike price
K = 100 e. The number of traded assets is n = 1 when only the underlying
stock is traded, or n = 2 when also the European call option with expiration
at time t∆T and strike price s1(t)(1 + r)
T−t is also traded in the portfolio.
For “Napoleon cliquet” options (4.9), we consider Nfix = 3 fixing dates,
with t0 = 0, t1 = 8, t2 = 16, t3 = 24 weeks, and coupon C = 0.1. For
barrier options, we have considered an up-and-out option with barrier
xu = 120 e, where the barrier level is checked only at trading instants.
When Monte Carlo simulation is used to price “Napoleon cliquet” and
Barrier options, L = 1000 scenarios are evaluated to compute the expected
payoff.
We will consider the log-normal stock price model (4.3) with1 µ = ra,
dzx1 ∼ N (0, 1) and volatility σ = 0.5, which will be also referred to as Black-
Scholes (BS) model, and Heston (H) model (4.4), with initial variance
y1(0) = 0.25, and parameters θ1 = 0.25, κ1 = 1, ω1 = 0.3, ρ1 = −0.5. In
all simulations we assume that the value of market volatility is estimated
exactly.
1In this particular case, the probability measure used for asset price and portfolio dynamics coincides
with the risk-neutral one. However, the reader should notice that this approach relies on the real-world
probability measure for asset price and portfolio dynamics.
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European call option
We first test the SMPC strategy (4.17) to replicate a European call option,
only trading the risk-free asset and the underlying stock (n = 1). Heston’s
model [38] is used both in the MPC formulation and to generate actual
market prices in simulation.
The analytical pricing formula [38] is used to compute future asset val-
ues pj(t + 1), j = 1, . . . ,M . The results are depicted in Figure 4.2, where
only the first 50 simulations are reported in Figure 4.2a and 4 simulations
in Figure 4.2b. The empirical distribution of the hedging error2 computed
on all Ns simulations is depicted in Figure 4.3 (purple line). The average
CPU time to execute Algorithm 1 is 81.2 ms. The average hedging error
(a) payoff function p(T ) and final wealth w(T ) (e)
as a function of the stock price s1(T ) at expiration
(e)
(b) Sample trajectories of wealth w(t) and option
price p(t)
Figure 4.2: Hedging a European call using SMPC based on Heston’s model (values in e)
E[e(T )] = −0.0511 e, E[|e(T )] = 1.9907, max |e(T )| = 14.5699. For com-
parison, Figure 4.3 also shows the error distribution when delta hedging3
is applied (green line), which takes an average CPU time of 2.5 ms per
2Hedging errors are sampled with the Freedman-Diaconis rule [28].
3 By letting ∆ = ∂p∂x , in Delta hedging at each time step the portfolio contains a quantity −∆ of asset
x. In our simulations ∆ is computed by differentiating the pricing formula [38] numerically.
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time step. In each simulation, the difference between the hedging error
e(T ) achieved by SMPC and the one obtained by delta hedging is within
±3.75 e.
Exotic options
The advantage of using the SMPC strategy becomes more evident when
replicating exotic options.
We use again Heston’s model [38] both as a market model and a predic-
tion model for stock prices. For the “Napoleon Cliquet” option, we only
consider the case n = 2 and we use Longstaff-Schwartz’s off-line approx-
imation (calibrated in 251.5310 s) to estimate the option price p(t) as a
function of the spot price s1(t), its variance y1(t), and of the spot prices at
past fixing dates s1(t0), . . . , s1(tk), with tk ≤ t < tk+1. On-line CPU time
is 0.4391 s (for comparison, when using on-line Monte Carlo simulation to
compute future options CPU time is 2.49 s).
Hedging results are reported in the third and fourth rows of Table 4.1,
where for comparison in the fifth row we also show the results obtained
through delta hedging.
For the barrier option, off-line pricing approximation takes 114.016 s to
estimate p(t) as a function of s1(t) and its variance y1(t). On-line CPU
time is 428.8 ms (n = 2). Hedging results are reported in the last two rows
of Table 4.2.
SMPC model E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] max |e(T )| CPU (ms)
Fixed Black 0.0031 0.0080 0.0561 1256.28
Implied Black 0.0031 0.0079 0.0560 1293.7
Heston (MC) 0.0032 0.0075 0.0516 6717.48
Heston (LS) 0.0025 0.0110 0.4159 439.1
∆ hedging -0.0032 0.0176 0.1344 33.7
Table 4.1: Napoleon Cliquet option (final hedging error e(T ) in e, MC=Monte Carlo
online pricing, LS=Longstaff&Schwartz oﬄine option price approximation)
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SMPC model E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] max |e(T )| CPU (ms)
Fixed Black -0.0324 0.6965 14.5866 113.12
Implied Black -0.0320 0.6956 14.5829 155.64
Heston 0.1936 0.7961 16.0870 363.76
∆ hedging -1.3060 2.4335 18.9145 103.0
Table 4.2: Barrier option (final hedging error e(T ) in e)
4.4.3 Robustness with respect to market modeling errors
Generating future scenarios of asset prices requires a model of their stochas-
tic and dynamic evolution. Getting such a model is often a complex task
and unavoidably affected by inaccuracy. This is due to the fact that we
are trying to enclose a huge net of complicated relationships, in addition
to a large source of randomness, in a small box. As complicated as the
model can be, one will never be able to catch the exact dynamics of the
assets, and in any case a very complicated model would lose the advan-
tages of modelization. Therefore, in general, the asset price model will
always be different from the way the real world behaves, and one must find
a compromise, by using a simple enough model which allows one to keep
computational complexity as low as possible.
In the previous sections we have assumed that the actual prices behave
according to the same model we use to predict their evolution (nominal
conditions). The hedging error was exclusively due to randomness. In
this section we test numerically the robustness of the SMPC algorithm not
only with respect to price stochasticity, but also when real and prediction
model mismatch. In particular, we assume that real assets evolve following
Heston’s model [38], while the simpler Black and Scholes model (4.3) is used
to generate future scenarios in SMPC.
The tool that will be used to concile the two models is the calibration
of the lognormal model (4.3) using the so-called implied volatility, that is
the market’s view of future actual volatility and is updated at each trading
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period from observed market prices of plain vanilla options (generated by
the Heston’s model [38] in our setting) by inverting (numerically) the Black-
Scholes pricing formula. Such a value of implied volatility will be used in
our simple prediction model (4.5). This approach could be seen as a way of
“projecting” the real market (which, in our case, follows Heston’s model)
onto the log-normal model.
4.4.4 Simulation results with respect to robustness
In the following tests we have considered that the real market evolves
according to Heston’s model with initial volatility σ = 0.5 (y1(0) = 0.25),
and that, to avoid bias in hedging errors due to wrong initial pricing, the
initial wealth of the portfolio is computed correctly using Heston’s model
and exact y1(0). For SMPC we consider instead three different models:
1. Fixed Black-Scholes : The log-normal model (4.3) is used to generate
future scenarios in SMPC, setting the volatility to a fixed arbitrary
value, different from the actual;
2. Implied Black-Scholes : at each prediction step the estimated implied
volatility is used in (4.3);
3. Heston: nominal case, both the SMPC model and the real market
model coincide, and the actual volatility is observed exactly.
European Call
We first test the robustness of the SMPC algorithm on a European call
option, only trading the risk-free asset and the underlying stock (n = 1).
The analytical pricing formula [38] is used to compute future asset values
pj(t+ 1), j = 1, . . . ,M .
Figure 4.3 shows the empirical discrete density function of the hedging
error e(T ) = w(T ) − p(T ) in the presence of modeling errors. Note that
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Figure 4.3: Comparing the empirical distribution of hedging errors among the four meth-
ods: Heston, Implied Black, Fixed Black and Delta Hedging.
all four distributions are bell-shaped. We can easily see that the density
of Fixed Black (red line) has fatter tails than the others and that Implied
Black (blue line) better follows the distribution of Heston (=the exact
model, purple line). While Fixed Black and Implied Black take approxi-
mately the same CPU time (9.6 ms and 10.2 ms per time step, respectively),
Heston (nominal conditions) takes 81.2 ms per time step. Delta Hedging
is faster: only takes 2.5 ms per time step, because it simply uses finite
differences.
The benefits of resorting to the discretization of the normal distribution
as in (4.14) with respect to Monte Carlo simulation pij = 1M are highlighted
in Table 4.3, where the Implied Black method is used to hedge in the SMPC
algorithm.
Note that the average final hedging error and the average absolute hedg-
ing error obtained when only 3 scenarios, weighted with the corresponding
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M pij E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] max |e(T )| CPU (ms)
100 1
M
-0.0587 2.0296 15.0929 10.2
8 1
M
-0.1177 3.7149 18.2113 3.4
8 Eq. (4.14) -0.0914 2.1517 13.7776 4.4
5 1
M
-0.1763 5.3472 20.4058 3.2
5 Eq. (4.14) -0.0962 2.1697 13.5410 3.8
3 1
M
-0.1717 5.2603 20.5207 3.1
3 Eq. (4.14) -0.0501 2.0153 15.2368 3.4
Table 4.3: Montecarlo vs. discretization of probability density function in generating
scenarios (European call, errors expressed in e)
probabilities as in (4.14), are used in SMPC are very similar to the case
with M = 100 scenarios generated by Monte Carlo, but with evident sav-
ings of CPU time.
Exotic options
The robustness with respect to modeling errors in the case of path-dependent
“Napoleon cliquet” options with payoff (4.9) is highlighted in (the first and
second rows of) Table 4.1, where we use M = 100 equally probably sce-
narios generated by using Longstaff-Schwartz’s off-line approximation. For
exotic options we only consider the case n = 2, that is, trading both the
asset and its associated call option. While all methods perform similarly,
it is apparent the computational benefits of hedging using the log-normal
model, in spite of the modeling error. Note that, although delta hedging is
the fastest algorithm, its performance in terms of E[|e(T )|] deteriorates by
almost 50% with respect to Implied Black and almost 60% with respect to
SMPC based on Heston’s model; partly this is because delta hedging does
not include options in the portfolio (n = 1). Similar results are obtained
on the up-and-out Barrier option, as shown in Table 4.2.
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4.5 Transaction costs
When trading assets on the market, one often suffers the friction of trans-
action costs [22]. In mathematical terms, the investor pays a quantity hi(t)
of wealth to change the number of assets in the portfolio from ui(t− 1) at
time t − 1 to u(t) at time t, for each asset i. Such wealth hi(t) is taken
away from the overall wealth w(t) of the portfolio, so that (4.11) becomes
(cf. [67])
w(t+ 1) = (1 + r)
(
w(t)−
n∑
i=1
hi(t)
)
+
n∑
i=1
bi(t)ui(t) (4.18)
Proposition 1 The variance of the hedging error e(t) = w(t)−p(t) is not
affected by transaction costs.
Proof: Let ω(t) =
∑n
i=1 hi(t) be the total transaction cost paid at
time t. As ω(t) is a deterministic function that only depends on u(t) (it
does not depend on s(t)), we get that the expected value of the hedging
error e(t+ 1) = w(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1) is
E[w(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1)] = E[(1 + r)w(t) +
n∑
i=1
bi(t)ui(t)
−p(t+ 1)− (1 + r)ω(t)]
= E[w0(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1)]− (1 + r)ω(t)
where w0(t + 1) is the wealth at time t + 1 in the absence of transaction
costs. Therefore, while the expectation E[e(t + 1)] of the hedging error
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e(t+ 1) is affected by ω(t), its variance Var[e(t+ 1)] is clearly not, as
Var[e(t+ 1)] = E[(e(t+ 1)− E[e(t+ 1)])2]
= E[(w0(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1)− (1 + r)ω(t)
−E[w0(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1)] + (1 + r)ω(t))2]
= Var[w0(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1)]
2
Proposition 1 has clearly shown that the minimum variance criterion (4.12)
is inadequate to handle transaction costs.
In the simplest case, transaction costs hi(t) are proportional to the
traded quantity of stock |ui(t)− ui(t− 1)|
hi(ui) = i|ui(t)− ui(t− 1)|si(t) (4.19)
where the fixed quantity i depends on commissions on trading asset i,
i = 1, . . . , n (we assume that no costs are applied on transacting the risk-
free asset).
4.5.1 Minimization of variance and expectation (QP-Var)
Let x(t), y(t) ∈ Rn be two vectors whose i-th components are nonnegative
and defined as
xi(t)− yi(t) = ui(t)− ui(t− 1) (4.20)
xi(t) ≥ 0, yi(t) ≥ 0, ∀t = 0, . . . , T
Accordingly, the cost hi(t) for trading a quantity ui(t)−ui(t−1) of the i-th
asset is hi(t) = i|ui(t)− ui(t− 1)|si(t) = γi(t)(xi(t) + yi(t)), where γi(t) ,
isi(t), i = 1, . . . , n. The quantities xi(t) and yi(t) can be interpreted,
respectively, as the amount of asset i bought at time t and the amount of
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asset i sold at time t. We can therefore introduce the new decision vector
v(t) =
[
x(t)
y(t)
]
∈ R2n of decision variables and replace u(t) ∈ Rn with
u(t) = u(t− 1) + x(t)− y(t) (4.21)
By letting
1I ,
1...
1
 ∈ RM , γ(t) ,
γ1(t)...
γn(t)

from (4.18) we can express the vector of future hedging errors e(t + 1) =
w(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1) on the M different scenarios as e
1(t+ 1)
...
eM(t+ 1)
 = B(t)u(t) + (1 + r) (w(t)− γ′(t)(x(t) + y(t))) 1I−
 p
1(t+ 1)
...
pM(t+ 1)

= B(t)(u(t− 1) + x(t)− y(t))
−(1 + r) 1I γ′(t)(x(t) + y(t)) +D(t)
= Av(t)v(t) +Bv(t)− 1IGv(t)v(t)
where
B(t) ,
 b
1
1(t) . . . b
1
n(t)
...
...
bM1 (t) . . . b
M
n (t)
 , D(t) , (1 + r) 1Iw(t)−
 p
1(t+ 1)
...
pM(t+ 1)

Bv(t) , B(t)u(t− 1) +D(t), Av(t) , [B(t)| −B(t)],
Gv(t) , (1 + r)[γ′(t)|+ γ′(t)]
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The hedging error e(t+ 1) = w(t+ 1)− p(t+ 1) has therefore the following
empirical expectation
E[e(t+ 1)] = pi′(Av(t)v(t) +Bv(t)− 1IGv(t)v(t))
= −Gv(t)v(t) + pi′(Av(t)v(t) +Bv(t)) (4.22)
where pi′ = [pi1 . . . piM ]′ ∈ RM , pi′ 1I = 1. Note that by (4.22) we can rewrite
E[e(t+ 1)] = K(t)−H(t), where K(t) = pi′[B(t)(x(t)− y(t)) +Bv(t)] and
H(t) = (1 + r)γ′(x(t) + y(t)). Therefore, K(t) depends on the quantity
x(t) − y(t) (i.e., on the net increment u(t) − u(t − 1) of the underlying
assets hold in portfolio from time t − 1 to time t) and is independent of
Λ(t) = min{x(t), y(t)} and of the transaction costs, while H(t) depends on
the actual number of transactions executed (simultaneously) to rebalance
the portfolio at time t, depends on Λ(t) and, via γ(t), on the transaction
costs (indeed, E[e(t+ 1)] can be decreased by increasing Λ(t)).
By letting ij be the j-th vector of the canonical basis of R
M , that is
I = [i1| . . . |iM ], and omitting the dependence of t for ease of notation we
get
E[e2(t+ 1)] =
M∑
j=1
pij
(
i′j(Avv +Bv − 1IGvv)
)2
= v′G′vGvv + (Avv +Bv)
′ diag(pi)(Avv +Bv)
−2pi′(Avv +Bv)Gvv (4.23)
E2[e(t+ 1)] =
(
M∑
j=1
piji
′
j(Avv +Bv − 1IGvv)
)2
= (pi′(Avv +Bv)−Gvv)2
= v′G′vGvv + (Avv +Bv)
′pipi′(Avv +Bv)
−2pi′(Avv +Bv)Gvv (4.24)
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Hence, the variance of e(t+ 1) is
Var[e(t+ 1)] = E[(e(t+ 1)− E[e(t+ 1)])2]
= E[e2(t+ 1)]− E2[e(t+ 1)] (4.25a)
= (Av(t)v(t) + Bv(t))
′(diag(pi)− pipi′)(Av(t)v(t) +Bv(t)) (4.25b)
Note that (4.25b) does not depend on γ(t), in accordance with Proposi-
tion 1, and that diag(pi)−pipi′ is a positive semidefinite matrix by definition:
v′(diag(pi)− pipi′)v =
M∑
i=1
piiv
2
i −
(
M∑
i=1
piivi
)(
M∑
j=1
pijvj
)
=
M∑
i=1
pii
(
v2i − 2vi
M∑
j=1
pijvj + vi
M∑
j=1
pijvj
)
=
(
M∑
i=1
pii(v
2
i − 2vi
M∑
j=1
pijvj)
)
+
(
M∑
i=1
piivi
)(
M∑
j=1
pijvj
)(
M∑
i=1
pii
)
=
M∑
i=1
pii
(
vi −
M∑
j=1
pijvj
)2
≥ 0, ∀v ∈ RM
Note also that Var[e(t+ 1)] does not depend on x(t)− y(t), and therefore
on Λ(t), that confirms what observed earlier about Λ(t) only affecting
transaction costs, that are deterministic.
In order to minimize both the variance and the expected value of the
one-step ahead hedging error e(t + 1) we solve the following optimization
problem
min
v(t)
Var[e(t+ 1)] + αE2[e(t+ 1)] (4.26)
s.t. v(t) ≥ 0
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where α is a fixed scalar, α ∈ [0, 0.5]. Problem (4.26) is a QP problem with
2n variables subject to nonnegativity constraints.
Note that the hedging strategy defined by (4.26) might lead to choosing
optimal quantities xi(t) and yi(t) that are both positive, that is Λi(t) ,
min{xi(t), yi(t)} > 0. This amounts to allow the trader to simultane-
ously buy and sell the same quantity Λi(t) of asset i at the same trad-
ing instant t (cf. [17, p. 290]) or, in alternative, to violate the self-
financing condition (4.11), by subtracting the wealth Λi(t)γi(t) from the
total portfolio wealth and rebalancing ui(t) = ui(t−1)+ x¯i(t)− y¯i(t), where
x¯i(t) = xi(t)−Λi(t), y¯i(t) = yi(t)−Λi(t). Clearly, x¯i(t)−y¯i(t) = xi(t)−yi(t)
and either x¯i(t) = 0 or y¯i(t) = 0. Constraining Λi(t) = 0 would make (4.26)
a nonconvex problem, therefore more complicated to solve numerically;
however, leaving Λi(t) unconstrained does not lead to undesired effects
from a hedging viewpoint. In fact, having xi(t) and yi(t) both positive
(Λi(t) > 0) might be a good choice to avoid super-replication without
altering variance. On the other hand, if at optimality E[e(t + 1)] ≤ 0,
that is one is under-replicating the option price at time t, then necessarily
Λi(t) = 0, otherwise x¯i(t), y¯i(t) would be a solution with the same vari-
ance and a lower E2[e(t+ 1)], thus providing a lower value of the objective
function in (4.26) than x(t), y(t).
Note also that one could minimize Var[e(t + 1)] + αE[e(t + 1)] instead
of (4.26), therefore not penalizing super-replication. In this setting, either
xi(t) = 0 or yi(t) = 0 spontaneously at optimality (that is, Λi(t) = 0), as,
as observed earlier, a positive quantity Λi(t) would only increase the term
H(t) due to transaction costs without altering K(t) and Var[e(t+ 1)].
An alternative formulation based on mixed-integer quadratic program-
ming, related to the approach of [30] but based on the theory of hybrid
dynamical systems [7], that can handle more general transaction costs is
reported in Appendix A.
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4.5.2 Minimization of conditional value at risk (LP-CVaR)
A drawback of the QP formulation (4.26) is that it requires the calibration
of the scalar α that achieves the best tradeoff between variance (=risk) and
expectation (=lack of hedging accuracy due to transaction costs). Con-
ditional Value at Risk (CVaR) can be used as an alternative performance
measure to penalize the hedging error e(t+1), and is defined as follows. Re-
calling the concept of CVaR in Section 2.1.3 let f(u, s) : Rn+k → R be a loss
function associated with the decision vector u ∈ Rn and with the random
vector s ∈ Rk. In our case u = u(t), s = m(t+1), f(u, s) = |e(t+1)| (in case
super-replication of the option price is not penalized, f(u, s) = −e(t+ 1)).
Let p(s) be the probability density function of s. We use CVaR to formu-
late the SMPC problem for dynamic hedging:
min
v(t),`(t),{zj(t)}Mj=1
`(t) +
1
1− β
M∑
j=1
pijzj(t) (4.27a)
s.t. zj(t) ≥ wj(t+ 1)− pj(t+ 1)− ` (4.27b)
zj(t) ≥ −wj(t+ 1) + pj(t+ 1)− ` (4.27c)
zj(t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,M (4.27d)
v(t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,M (4.27e)
for the given fixed value of β, where wj(t + 1) − pj(t + 1) is given by
(4.22).Problem (4.27) is an LP problem with M + n + 1 variables and
3M constraints. Note that by removing constraint (4.27b) one does not
penalize super-replication of the option price, as the loss function becomes
max{−e(t+ 1), 0}.
4.5.3 Minimization of worst-case error (LP-MinMax)
A simpler approach than CVaR is to penalize the worst-case loss over the
set of M generated scenarios, that is the largest absolute value |e(t + 1)|
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of the hedging error. The resulting formulation is the linear program
min
v(t),`(t)
`(t) (4.28a)
s.t. `(t) ≥ wj(t+ 1)− pj(t+ 1) (4.28b)
`(t) ≥ −wj(t+ 1) + pj(t+ 1) (4.28c)
`(t) ≥ 0 (4.28d)
v(t) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . ,M (4.28e)
where wj(t + 1)− pj(t + 1) is given by (4.22). Note that the LP (4.28) is
simpler than (4.27) as it only involves n+1 variables and 2M+1 constraints.
In contrast, it is clear that the LP-MinMax formulation (4.28) does not
exploit the available information about the probability distribution of the
stochastic variables that affect the portfolio evolution.
4.5.4 Simulation results with transaction costs
We test the SMPC formulations for dynamic hedging of Section 4.5 on a
European plain vanilla call option and on a barrier option. All simulations
were run on a MacBook Pro 2.66 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo processor and
4 Gb RAM running MATLAB R2009b. The QP solver QUADPROG of the
Optimization Toolbox was used to solve QP problems, while the solver
GLPK [53] was used to solve LP problems.
We test the proposed three SMPC algorithms defined, respectively,
by (4.26), (4.27), and (4.28) under different scenario generation settings:
M = 100 and M = 1000 scenarios generated by Monte Carlo simulation
(pii =
1
M , ∀i = 1, . . . ,M), and M = 5 with pii obtained by discretizing a
Gaussian distribution of s(t + 1) as described (4.14) - (4.16). Let ∆T = 1
week be the time interval between two consecutive trading dates. The
option expires after T = 24 intervals, and ra = 4% is the annualized con-
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tinuously compounded interest rate so that r = e0.04
1
54 − 1 = 0.00074102 is
the return of the risk free investment over ∆T .
We consider a single stock s1(t) with initial spot price s1(0) = 100 e.
For European call options (4.8), we consider the strike price K = 100 e,
while for barrier options, we consider an up-and-out option with barrier
xu = 115 e, where the barrier level is checked only at trading instants. In
the following tests we will consider two different cases:
• (n = 1) The replicating portfolio is composed by the underlying stock
and a cash position in the money market account (a set-up similar to
common “delta” hedging);
• (n = 2) The replicating portfolio is composed, besides the previous two
assets, by a position in an at-the-money (ATM) European call option
whose expiry coincides with the expiration date T of the product to
be hedged (a set-up similar to common “delta” and “vega” hedging).
Note that, in the second case, at each trading date t the call option to
be traded is ATM (i.e., strike price = s1(t)(1 + r)
T−t), meaning that all
options previously held at time t−1 have been cleared in order to buy/sell
the newer ATM options.
We consider the log-normal stock price model (4.3) with µ = ra, dz1 ∼
N (0, 1) and volatility σ = 0.5 when hedging the call option, while σ = 0.3
when hedging the barrier option and we assume the idealized case of the
real market generating prices according to the same model.
We first test the SMPC algorithm on a European call option, only trad-
ing the underlying stock and the risk free asset (n = 1). The transaction
cost to trade the underlying stock is 1 = 2.5%. The strategy is tested over
Ns = 100 simulations.
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QP-Var formulation
Consider the method based on QP described in Section 4.5.1, where prob-
lem (4.26) is solved instead of (4.17). We first need to calibrate the relative
weight α in (4.26). To this end, for a set of different values of α we compute
the variance and expectation of the final hedging error e(T ) from a set of
Ns = 100 simulations by running the SMPC algorithm based on (4.26)
with M = 100 scenarios. The test has been made for 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5. Higher
values of α would lead to an excessive risk exposure, since the expected
error would be predominant.
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(a) Variance of the final hedging error for 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5
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(b) Expected final hedging error for 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.5
Figure 4.4: Final variance Var[e(T )] and expectation E[e(T )] of the final hedging error
e(T ), used for the calibration of parameter α
In Figure 4.4 the results of the calibration phase are highlighted. As
expected, the variance increases with high values of α, while the expected
hedging error E[e(T )] decreases. However, the decrement in the expected
error is much less dramatic than the increment of variance. For a given risk
attitude of the trader, the plot of Figure 4.4 helps choosing the tradeoff
parameter α. Here the value α = 0.25 is selected to run the SMPC algo-
rithm based on (4.26) for three different values of M (predicted scenarios):
M = 100 (pij =
1
100), M = 1000 (pij =
1
1000), and M = 5 (pii is obtained by
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Model Monte Carlo M = 100 Monte Carlo M = 1000 discretized Gaussian M = 5
E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] min(e(T )) Var[e(T )] CPU(s) E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] min(e(T )) Var[e(T )] CPU(s) E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] min(e(T )) Var[e(T )] CPU(s)
QP-Var -1.23 2.16 -7.48 6.27 0.026 -1.17 2.22 -8.63 6.99 0.26 -1.28 2.31 -6.78 6.96 0.01
LP-CVaR -1.27 2.27 -6.74 6.42 0.017 -1.10 2.20 -7.42 6.80 1.11 -1.28 2.39 -6.88 7.46 0.001
LP-MinMax -1.23 2.28 -6.85 7.15 0.006 -1.28 2.35 -6.69 7.21 0.18 -1.29 2.41 -6.88 7.60 0.001
Delta Hedging -0.1312 1.77 -5.4 4.84 0.00012 -0.1312 1.77 -5.4 4.84 0.00012 -0.1312 1.77 -5.4 4.84 0.00012
Table 4.4: SMPC results for the European call option
Model LS M = 100 LS M = 5 LS M = 1000
E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] min(e(T )) Var[e(T )] CPU(s) E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] min(e(T )) Var[e(T )] CPU(s) E[e(T )] E[|e(T )|] min(e(T )) Var[e(T )] CPU(s)
QP-Var -0.55 0.97 -7.29 3.27 0.09 -0.44 1.12 -9.40 4.85 0.01 -0.55 0.98 -7.04 3.24 0.37
LP-CVaR -0.39 1.09 -8.03 3.89 0.08 -0.34 1.25 -9.83 5.33 0.001 -0.44 1.04 -7.68 3.66 1.04
LP-MinMax -0.56 1.22 -8.82 4.81 0.07 -0.28 1.58 -10.73 6.84 0.001 -0.52 1.32 -8.84 5.23 0.33
Delta Hedging -0.70 1.79 -16.14 13.61 0.0041 -0.70 1.79 -16.14 13.61 0.0041 -0.70 1.79 -16.14 13.61 0.0041
Table 4.5: SMPC results for the barrier option
sampling the Gaussian function). The obtained results are shown in the
first row of Table 4.4.
It is apparent that the global performance obtained with the three dif-
ferent values of M are comparable, with a slightly higher maximum error
in the case M = 1000. This suggests that increasing M over a certain num-
ber of predicted scenarios does not necessarily lead to improvements. The
discretization leads to some minor savings of CPU time, but the hedging
performance gets worse.
LP-CVaR and LP-MinMax formulations
The last two rows of Table 4.4 highlight the performance of the two pro-
posed LP formulations, where either the LP (4.27) with β = 0.95 or the
LP (4.28) is solved instead of (4.17). The results obtained with the two ap-
proaches are similar (especially in the case M = 5), the LP (4.28) providing
a slightly higher variance with respect to the other two formulations.
In the last row of Table 4.4 the results obtained with delta hedging on
the same option are shown. We can see that for plain vanilla options this
last method outperforms the SMPC approach. A plot of the wealth of the
portfolio against the option value at expiration date is shown in Figure 4.5
for the case of LP-MinMax hedging.
Note that, differently from the case of absence of transaction costs, the
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Figure 4.5: Payoff function p(T ) and final wealth w(T ) (e) for the LP-MinMax approach
with discretization of the density function
final wealth of the portfolio, represented by the green asterisks, does not
track exactly the payoff function, but is shifted below of an almost fixed
distance (the fixed transaction cost).
Barrier option
Since the value of a barrier option is much lower than the corresponding call
option, we have decreased the transaction costs at 1.5% of the underlying
price to better test the SMPC algorithms. Pricing of future option values is
made by using the approximation method of [51] (LS). A number M = 100
of future scenarios is considered, and compared to the cases of M = 1000
and M = 5 scenarios obtained by sampling the Gaussian distribution.
We have run Ns = 50 simulations for each setting. It can be seen that
the best global performance is given by the QP-Var method. LP-CVaR
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Figure 4.6: Payoff function p(T ) and final wealth w(T ) (e) for the MinMax approach with
discretization of the density function
provides similar results, while LP-MinMax goes slightly worse. Longstaff-
Schwartz’s option pricing method with M = 1000 scenarios does not yield
considerable improvements with respect to M = 100, it only worsen the
required CPU time. The discretization of the Gaussian curve provides
worse performance in terms of minimum error. Nevertheless, this method
represents a good tradeoff between hedging performance and CPU time.
In conclusion, Longstaff-Schwartz’s option pricing method with M =
100 scenarios is the best approach in terms of expected absolute hedging
error and variance, and in particular the LP-CVaR approach, showing a
comparable performances but a lower computational effort. The largest
hedging errors appear when the stock price gets close to the barrier without
overpassing it, as hedging becomes particularly difficult because of the
discontinuity of the payoff function.
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4.6 Conclusions
After recasting the dynamic hedging problem of financial options as a
stochastic control problem, we have proposed a stochastic model predic-
tive control approach based on a minimum variance criterion to rebalance
periodically the portfolio underlying the option. In a first instance we as-
sumed that transaction costs are negligible. We showed that the tool is
very versatile for dynamic option hedging, as it can handle multiple assets,
very general exotic options and payoff functions, and rather general stock
price models, and is also robust with respect to market modeling assump-
tions. The computational demand of the SMPC approach is mostly due to
pricing future option values, a task that can be alleviated in three ways:
(i) by approximating the pricing function off-line, (ii) by using a simpli-
fied log-normal model (with implied volatility), and (iii) by sampling the
uniform distribution instead of generating random and equally probably
samples using Monte Carlo simulation.
At a later stage the proposed SMPC techniques have been extended in
the case of transaction costs, although the minimum variance criterion is
proven to be no longer suitable to handle this type of market. Three alter-
native SMPC approaches (QP-Var, LP-CVaR, and LP-MinMax) have been
proposed, showing good hedging performance, but only outperforming the
traditional delta hedging technique and static hedging when applied on ex-
otic options. When CPU time is a concern, LP-CVaR is probably the best
candidate formulation for SMPC, as it provides acceptable performance
while involving only a small number of variables, and without requiring
the calibration of the tradeoff parameter α as in the QP-Var method.
The potential use of SMPC by financial institutions is twofold. It can
be used on-line to suggest trading moves to traders, or off-line to run
extensive simulations and quantify the average hedging error for a given
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market model and option type.
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Chapter 5
Optimal bidding on energy markets
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 contains a short overview
on the deregulated energy markets and the new challenges addressed by
market operators. In Section 5.2 the main aspects of the current market
design are described with reference to the Dutch electricity market. In
Section 5.3 a novel market architecture devised in E-Price for double-sided
ancillary services is presented.
5.1 Introduction
The recent changes in the deregulated energy market are leading the Eu-
ropean Community to seek a unified and common network code for the
production, transmission and control of power systems [63] in European
countries. The network codes developed by ENTSO-E1 will help reach the
three objectives of the Third Package, a set of directives and regulations
that came into force in March 2011 for establishing binding Europe-wide
network codes. These objectives are:
• the secure operation of European power systems;
• the integration of large volumes of low carbon generation;
1European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
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• and the creation of a Single Europe-wide Electricity Market.
The motivation behind is the need for a common network protocol allow-
ing for cross-border exchanges of electricity, facilitating the competition
between companies, guaranteeing the security of energy supply, and help-
ing reach the ambitious climate change objectives imposed by the European
Union [15].
The E-Price scope goes towards this concept and envisions Europe-
oriented market architectures, ICT interfaces and decentralized control
systems. In particular, this thesis focuses on optimal control of BRPs,
legal entities allowed to trade energy on the market and bearing respon-
sibility for the correct and safe operation of the grid. Typically, a BRP
is a large-scale production plant, a set of small-size consumers or a com-
bination of the two. Independent of their size, BRPs communicate with
the market and the TSO using the same protocol, and they are therefore
required to use the same standard interfaces. The behavior of each BRP is
influenced by internal and structural characteristics like risk attitude, gen-
eration assets, cost structure, and by exogenous inputs like price signals,
renewable sources stochasticity, uncontrollable and price-elastic loads. The
real-time optimal control of BRP power injections is highly connected to
capacity allocation and provision of ancillary services. In fact, the capa-
bility of the BRP to respond to real-time signals is strictly correlated to
the available reserve capacity at disposal, that is the result of a thorough
operation planning.
BRPs can choose several ways to deliver their output. Over-The-Counter
(OTC) [68] contracts are nowadays highly exploited in the European mar-
kets. The main motivation is that they bind sure incomes for BRPs and
prevent power consumers with a high and steady request of power from
being negatively exposed to the volatility of energy prices. However, the
constantly growing focus for real-time optimization in power production
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brought the attention of researchers on the day ahead and on the ancillary
services markets. The more sophisticated forecast and control techniques
should be able to compensate for the volatility of renewable sources and
prices, bringing a consistent advantage of the real time markets over the
static long term contracts. The day ahead market for electricity is also
called Power Exchange (PX), where BRPs express the desired power pro-
file and expected incomes for each hour or PTU (program time unit) of the
following day. Those bids are then cleared by an independent system oper-
ator obtaining an E-Program for the next day. After the disclosure of the
E-Program the ancillary services (AS) market auction takes place, where
BRPs can buy/sell residual capacity for secondary control in real time. It
is evident that DA and AS markets are strongly coupled: the energy sold
on the spot market cannot be re-assigned to AS capacity reserves. In order
to get the maximal benefit from the BRP operation one must take into
account possible price fluctuations, stochasticity deriving from renewable
sources and intermittent load. In this context, forecasting techniques and
decentralized control are the key elements to provide a reliable activity.
In real-time operations, the existence of an imbalance market (or real-
time market) is required to deal with unavoidable deviations from the
E-Program, due to uncertainties in power demand and generation. Unlike
day-ahead prices, imbalance prices are extremely more volatile, and are
affected by counterintuitive phenomena, like negative values. In real time,
the BRP must fulfill its E-Program, trying, insofar as possible, to avoid
imbalance costs and to fulfill its own internal balance.
In this thesis we describe a novel market architecture designed for the
AS bidding auction and we introduce a bidding strategy that can be used
by BRPs to submit offers. The main characteristic of this market design
is its double-sided nature, that gives to BRPs the possibility of placing,
in addition to bids, also requests for capacity reserves, providing a confi-
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dence interval on the possible deviation from the contracted program. The
main responsibility for the smooth operation of power systems is therefore
shifted from the centralized TSO (or Transmission System Operator) to
decentralized BRPs. This market structure has been first introduced in
[74].
5.2 Current market design
In the deregulated energy market, BRPs must submit profit-maximizing
energy bids and offers for the spot market (PX) and for the regulating
capacity or ancillary services market (AS). The market design highly in-
fluences the bidding strategies. The current Dutch market, that has been
taken as the standard benchmark for our work, besides a set of bilateral
contracts, consists of a Power Exchange, an Intraday market and an ancil-
lary services market, as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: The energy markets (source: [48])
One day before the delivery generators compose and submit bids to the
Power Exchange (PX). Thereafter the market clearing price (MCP) and
the power volumes are assigned to each plant, determining the E-Program.
Intraday markets are then available in multiple sessions to trade un-cleared
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bids or foreseen deviations closer to delivery. Up to one hour prior to de-
livery, BRPs submit offers for regulating capacity on the ancillary services
market. Ancillary services include control reserves (which are divided into
primary, secondary and tertiary resources) and emergency reserves. The
supply of primary resources is compulsory for eligible generators, and is
aimed to stabilize the system frequency after a disturbance. The activa-
tion time must be lower than 30 seconds. Secondary reserves are released
subsequently to restore the nominal system frequency within 15 minutes
(1 program time unit, PTU). Finally, tertiary reserves are those reserves
whose activation time is greater than 4 PTUs, and are used to economically
optimize the deployment of reserve capacity. The ancillary services dealt
with in this thesis are secondary reserves. Generators with installed power
higher than 60 MW are obliged to offer all the power they can increase
or decrease by activating controllable generators. Those bids are sorted in
ascending order as shown in Figure 5.2 and activated, the most convenient
first, by the TSO to satisfy the real-time need for regulating capacity. BRPs
supplying regulating capacity are rewarded at the marginal price, meaning
that the imbalance price is the price of the last activated bid. BRPs incur-
ring an imbalance pay their deviation from the E-Program at this price.
An essential description of the background framework is contained in [72].
Generally speaking, power plants that are deemed price-takers tend
to bid at their marginal cost. Indeed, since the behavior of these plants
is not supposed to influence the final market outcome, they accept the
cleared price as a result, under the condition that this price is higher than
the marginal production cost, and therefore some profit is guaranteed.
The imbalance settlement can be seen as a modified version of Bertrand
competition [46]: the TSO is willing to buy as much as possible from the
firm with the lower price (even though it will pay at the biggest cleared
price). Therefore no BRP has incentive to deviate from its marginal cost.
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Fig. 3. Bidding Ladder
When there is a need for regulating capacity, the bidding
ladder is used to determine the order in which the capacities
are dispatched. The ‘cheapest’ bids will be dispatched first
until the desired amount of capacity is made available.
If the TSO calls for a specific bid on the imbalance market,
the BRP responsible for this bid is asked to deliver the
requested power Psc. In order to give the BRP an incentive to
deliver Psc, its E-program is offset with the requested power
resulting in the final E-program Efinal[n]
Efinal[n] = Eprog[n] +
￿
PTU
Psc[k] (7)
= Eprog[n] + Esc[n]. (8)
Note that (7) even holds when the TSO does not request for
secondary power, i.e. Psc[k] = 0 resulting in Efinal[n] =
Eprog[n].
D. Imbalance Price
The imbalance price λimb [e/MWh] is the price related to
imbalance in the system due to a deviation from the E-program
∆Eprog[n] defined as
∆Eprog[n] = Efinal[n]− Egen[n], (9)
where Egen[n] represents the total amount of generated elec-
trical energy on top of the internal load PL of the BRP. Hence
Egen[n] is defined as
Egen[n] =
￿
PTU
(PG[k]− PL[k]), (10)
with PG the total generated power within the BRP as the sum
of all generator outputs.
When the BRP has an energy surplus (∆Eprog > 0), the
TSO buys this surplus energy at λimb. Vice versa, when the
BRP has an energy shortage (∆Eprog < 0), the BRP buys
the lacking energy from the TSO at λimb. Whether or not
this transaction costs money for the BRP depends solely on
the difference between λimb and the actual cost λprod for
producing ∆Eprog. E.g. when ∆Eprog > 0 the BRP receives
λimb from the TSO and pays λprod to generate the excess
energy. Hence the BRP has a net profit of λimb − λprod. In
case of ∆Eprog < 0 the BRP pays λimb for the lacking energy
and saves λprod for not producing the same amount of energy.
Hence the BRP has a net profit of λprod−λimb. So depending
on the direction of the E-program deviation and the actual λimb
the BRP either earns or loses money. λimb is determined by
the dispatch price, control state and price incentive[5], [7], [8].
1) Dispatch Price: When the TSO requests reserve capacity
it will call for the cheapest bids on the bidding ladder. At the
end of the PTU, the dispatch price (DP) is determined by the
most expensive bid requested. In Fig. 3 this is illustrated for
both positive and negative reserve capacity requests. Here the
shaded bids are requested and the most expensive bid in each
direction determines the positive DP, λpos, and negative DP,
λneg, in [e/MWh]. If during a PTU, the TSO does not request
any reserve capacity at all, DP is chosen to be equal to the
average of the cheapest positive and cheapest negative bid.
This is defined as the middle price, λmid.
2) Control State: The control state (CS) is an indication
of the direction of the imbalance of the overall system[9].
The CS is based on all calls on the imbalance market during
one PTU, and can take four different values: 0, -1, +1 and
2. If the system was well balanced during the whole PTU,
the TSO neither calls for positive or negative reserve power.
As a result CS equals 0. If only positive reserve capacity is
requested during a PTU CS = +1, i.e. the system has a power
shortage. If only negative capacity is requested CS = −1, i.e.
the system has a power surplus. In the situation that the TSO
had to call for both positive and negative capacity during a
single PTU, CS is a little more complicated[9]. For simplicity
assume CS = 2 in such situation.
3) Price Incentive: To give the BRPs an extra incentive to
keep to their respective E-programs a price incentive λin is
included in the total λimb. Based on the performance of the
system, the TSO alters λimb according to specific rules. Since
the introduction of λin in 2001, its value has decreased to zero
with only a few exceptions. λin is therefore neglected in the
remainder of this paper. It is only represented in this section
for a complete understanding of the construction of λimb.
With the above parameters defined, λimb is calculated as
shown in Table I. Remember that ∆Eprog < 0 implies that
the BRP pays the TSO for extra energy and vice versa. e.g.
TABLE I
PRICE COMPOSITION OF THE IMBALANCE PRICE λimb
Control State ∆Eprog > 0 ∆Eprog < 0
0 λmid − λin λmid + λin
-1 λneg − λin λneg + λin
+1 λpos − λin λpos + λin
2 λneg − λin λpos + λin
assume CS = +1 and that a certain BRP has fallen short to
its E-program (∆Eprog < 0). The BRP has to buy the missing
energy from the TSO at the price the TSO itself paid at the
imbalance market in order to restore the system balance. Hence
the BRP has to pay λpos+λin. Because the imbalance market
is a free market, the bids are assumed to be made at marginal
cost. Therefor the following relation holds:
λpos > λprod > λneg, (11)
Figure 5.2: The bid ladder for ancillary services
It is an established result that when competing on prices and in transparent
markets, firms tend to settle at th ir marginal cost (Bertrand competition,
[20, 78]), while when competing on quantities (Cournot competition), the
equilibrium is found above marginal costs. On the other hand, big power
producers with market power have their private bidding strategies that
cannot be revealed.
The bidding activity is crucial for the BRP’s economic quilibrium, and
involves the analysis of several sources of u certainty. First, energy prices
are highly volatile and can range from a few euros per MWh up to 1000 e.
Price forecasts occupy a central role, since a bad bidding strategy can lead
to severe losses. Stochastic models of electricity prices, that are affected
by high volatility and jumps, are presented in [59] and [73]. The latter
considers the dynamical evolution of volatility and introduces parameter-
varying models such as GARCH models. Second, the generator has its own
load to satisfy, which is usually stochastic (cf. [23] for a possible approach
to short-ter lo d forecasts) as well as the available amount of renewable
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sources, over which only (more or less reliable) predictions can be given.
Third, as the Day-ahead and the ancillary services markets mutually affect
each other and the production is finite, a BRP has to decide where to
allocate its capacity in order to optimize an economic objective that can
be the pure expected profit or a risk-based signal.
An important distinction has to be made between integrated markets
and sequential markets. In integrated markets the day ahead and ancillary
services auctions are cleared at the same time, while the couplings and
market linkages between them are explicitly accounted for. This means
that BRPs must submit two independent bids without knowing either of
the two market outcomes. Although integrated markets are more mathe-
matically insightful and can be proven to reach the optimum social welfare
under some conditions (cf. [42]), they are more complex and difficult to
implement, especially when renewable sources are in place. In this case
BRPs must account for the stochasticity affecting prices and also renew-
able production and load, that can be very high if the markets are cleared
far ahead in time (usually at 12.00 of the day before delivery). For this
reason the market structure more often implemented in practice is sequen-
tial: the AS market is executed only after the day ahead outcome has been
revealed.
To overcome the limitations related to integrated markets, we consider
a market arrangement where day ahead and ancillary services markets are
executed in two subsequent sessions. A contribution to the market design
considered in this work in which coupling between prices is avoided is con-
tained in [75], where potential benefits and downsides of such a market
structure are illustrated. The design strategies proposed in the cited work
include the execution of iterated spot and ancillary services auctions, thus
implying multiple sequential bidding sessions to ensure convergence. A
kind of decoupled bidding strategy is implemented on real systems in the
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Australian Energy Market [1]. Here, generators offers to the AS market are
incremental price functions of the available reserve capacity, depending on
the energy dispatched at the PX level. In the remainder, we can hence ne-
glect the coupling between prices, since the outcome of the clearing process
is known when the ancillary services bids are sent to the TSO.
5.2.1 OTC contracts and day ahead market
Over the Counter (OTC) contracts are a widespread form of long-term
arrangement, preventing market agents from being exposed to the highly
volatile prices of energy. In this type of arrangement, the BRP can agree
upon a supply contract with a retail company, for example yearly and split
into base and peak load, based on a four season load profile of the retail
company. The BRP is then obliged to deliver the contracted blocks of
power for one year, as in Figure 5.3(a).
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Figure 5.3: Base and peak load OTC (source: APX-ENDEX)
In practice the load profile deviates from the planned load profile as
given in Figure 5.3(b) from day to day.
These deviations are based on day-ahead predictions of the retail com-
pany which are sent to the BRP. Different possibilities can be chosen to
handle them, namely:
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1. OTC deals or contracts for the day-ahead;
2. Negotiating hourly bids and offers with an external Generator Com-
pany or BRP which may also result in OTC contracts;
3. Hourly bids and offers to the day-ahead market.
Figure 5.3(b) shows the day-ahead contracted buy volumes approaching
the day-ahead load profile with the objective to reduce imbalance during
the following day. As can be deduced from this figure, deviations will
always arise on the day of contract execution.
One day before the delivery, the Transmission System Operator operates
the clearing of the market crossing the aggregated day-ahead bid curve
with the aggregated load profile (which is usually price-unelastic). The
clearing price and volume for the spot market is the value detected by the
intersection of the two curves, the clearing price is the price applied to
every transaction on the market.
5.2.2 Ancillary Services Market
Regulating and reserve capacity can be up-regulating (involving situations
of power shortages) or down-regulating (concerning situations of power
overproduction). In conventional systems, every generator whose nominal
capacity is greater than 60 MW is obliged to bid on the ancillary services
market all the power they can increase (upward) or decrease (downward).
Moreover, the market is only able to process supply bids from BRPs.
Supply Si indicates the residual capacity a BRP i wants to sell, so that
it wants to be paid for. It implies a positive cash flow, meaning that the
BRP is receiving an amount of money from the TSO. In particular:
• S+i stands for positive supply (BRP is willing to be paid for additional
production),
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• S−i stands for negative supply (BRP is willing to be paid for additional
absorption).
In the current system BRPs can only take back their bids in the intraday
market, for example in case some breakdown occurs and it becomes evident
that the plant can not fulfill the submitted program. Being the intraday
market closer in time to delivery, it is possible to better approximate the
deviation from the scheduled E-Program.
5.3 A novel market design for ancillary services
The main element of innovation in E-Price is the double-sided nature of
the AS markets. The concept, whose details are deepened later in this
section, is to provide the TSO with a quite accurate estimate of the possible
deviation from the E-Program, in such a way that the market can be
prepared in advance, allowing to save imbalance costs. In the framework
envisioned by E-Price, besides offers S+ and S−, ancillary services also
include the request Ri, indicating all the energy BRP i wants to buy and
can be bidirectional. It implies a negative cash flow, meaning that the
BRP is willing to pay an amount of money. In particular:
• R+i implies positive request (BRP expects to be “long” and hence is
willing to pay for additional absorption),
• R−i implies negative request (BRP expects to be “short” and hence is
willing to pay for additional injection).
Bids for the AS market refer to program time units (PTUs) of 15 minutes
and can be sent up to one hour prior to the delivery. Let us define the
following prices (in e/MWh):
• λPX is the day ahead price,
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• λAS− is the price for down regulating capacity,
• λAS+ is the price for up regulating capacity,
• λ−imb is the price for downward imbalance (power surplus),
• λ+imb is the price for upward imbalance (power shortage),
Sign convention is as follows: λAS+ ≥ 0, λAS− ≤ 0, λ+imb ≥ 0 and
λ−imb ≤ 0. A BRP can participate in both the AS- and AS+ markets.
When the AS markets are cleared, the prices λAS+(k) and λAS−(k) are
determined, as well as the the net position of each BRP EAS+i (k) and
EAS−i (k). Therefore, from this process a BRP can either result as a supplier
or a requestor. Payments for the only allocation of AS are proportional to
the AS price λAS±. Trading on the AS markets can therefore lead to a
positive profit (S) or to a cost (R):
ICA,i =
NPTU∑
k=1
aEAS+i (k)λ
AS+(k) +
NPTU∑
k=1
aEAS−i (k)λ
AS−(k) (5.1)
Where a is a design parameter of the market. In other words, the term
a might be seen as the cost for participating to the double-sided market.
For example, if a BRP results as a requestor of up-regulating power for
PTU k, its cleared capacity EAS+i (k) is negative (R
+) and it has to pay
aEAS+i (k)λ
AS+(k) to reserve the quantity EAS+i (k) for regulating purposes.
We use the sign convention for the cleared volumes and prices as shown in
Figure 5.4.
In real time operations, the TSO sends in each TP seconds (in the sim-
ulation framework, TP = 4) a request signal called ∆Pi to BRPs, which
is the request for varying the power output of controllable generators. If
the need for upward regulating energy occurs, the TSO sends in positive
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Figure 5.4: Volumes and prices cleared at the AS market: upper part up-regulating, lower
part down-regulating
∆Pi, on the contrary, if too much energy is present on the grid, the TSO
transmits negative ∆Pi. The signal ∆Pi is distributed among BRPs based
on their cleared capacity. The profit obtained by the supply of regulating
power on the AS in PTU k is defined as follows:
IAS,i(k) =
NTp∑
t=1
(w∆Pi(t)λ
AS+(t) + (1− w)∆Pi(t)λAS−(t)) TP
3600
(5.2)
where
w =
{
1 if ∆Pi(t) ≥ 0,
0 if ∆Pi(t) < 0
(5.3)
where NTp is the number of TP periods in a PTU. Note that IAS,i always
denotes a profit, as the signs of ∆Pi and λ
AS are always concordant.
One could argue that the intraday market is already in place with the
aim to trade the expected deviations from E-Program arising from better
forecasts of renewable sources and prices. However, intraday markets and
double-sided AS differ in that the energy on the intraday market is traded,
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meaning that the transactions have to take place if one does not want to
incur imbalance costs, while on the double-sided AS market reserves are
only allocated, and called if the need for the reserved regulating capacity
arises in real time. So, only the energy actually needed is delivered. More-
over, it has been observed that Dutch intraday markets lack liquidity, thus
meaning that BRPs are not appropriately incentivized to participate. The
aim of E-Price is to design a market for ancillary services where market
participants receive economic incentives to bid.
5.3.1 Double-sided markets: the concept
We now recover the underlying concept of the double sided AS auction.
The innovative market arrangement we refer to has been presented for the
first time in [74].
All the calculations are expressed in terms of power, that is linked to
energy by the relation E = PTs, where Ts is the sampling time (here,
Ts = 15 min = 1 PTU). Each BRP has at disposal controllable (gas, coal,
nuclear) and uncontrollable generators (wind, solar). Each plant is charac-
terized by specific switch on/off costs, marginal costs and efficiency. The
production of the controllable generators pci range in the interval [p
c
i
; pci ],
while for the uncontrollable generation pui the BRP only has some forecast,
for which a probability density function can be defined with mean p˜ui .
The mean value is used to bid on the day-ahead market. Only this
value is meaningful over such a long time horizon. The expected value
of uncontrollable production is then offered at the day-ahead market, or,
equivalently, is withdrawn from the Unit Commitment evaluation, that is
executed after the communication of the E-Program to decide which plants
have to be switched on during the next day and at what power level they
must be operating in order to produce the assigned energy. Combining
the controllable and uncontrollable generation we obtain a total power
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production of pi = p
u
i +p
c
i , as shown in Figure 5.5, ranging from pi = p
c
i
+ p˜ui
to pi = p
c
i + p˜
u
i .
pdf (p(k))
0
ppi pi
Figure 5.5: Superposition of controllable and uncontrollable power
The BRP bids the whole power from p
i
to pi. After clearing, the BRP
knows that the power pi(k) must be produced at PTU k of the next day.
This will be the expected value of its total production, as shown in Fig-
ure 5.6. However, due to stochasticity, the production can be in any point
on the curve in Figure 5.6.
Figure 2. Caption....
max a−i (k)max a+i (k)
pi pi
pi(k)0
R+i (k) R
−
i (k)
pdf (p(k))
Figure 5.6: Upward and downward regulating capacity
The quantities max a+i (k) and max a
−
i (k), respectively the difference
between pi(k) and the lower controllable boundary pi and the difference
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between the upper saturation limit pi and pi(k), represent the power that
can be increased or decreased by controllable generation. In fact, if the ac-
tual production is higher than pi(k) (for example, if more wind is blowing),
BRP i can use the controllable generators to fulfill the E-Program, up to
the quantity r− = max a+i (k). The same holds in case of under-production,
where the BRP can increase its own generators up to r+ = max a
−
i (k). As
a result, if the BRP wants to use own controllable generation to keep up
with the schedule, it faces a risk of imbalance highlighted by the red areas
A1 (over-production) and A2 (under-production). Since using own control-
lable generation has costs that are sometimes higher than participating to
the AS market, it might be not economically beneficial to fully employ it to
fulfill the E-Program. If the BRP decides to hedge only against a certain
percentage of its variability, let us say for the interval [−R+i (K), R−i (k)],
the risk of imbalance is reduced to the sum of the two blue areas in Fig-
ure 5.6. The BRP might be not able to cover for all the desired regulating
reserve or, on the contrary, it could be sometimes able to cover for more
than required. In conclusion, to cover for the interval [−R+i (K), R−i (k)],
the BRP can buy or sell a certain amount of reserve on the market.
The quantities r+ and r− are offered to the market in the form of (up-
ward regulating and downward regulating) bids. This market design, that
might seem counterintuitive because the BRP offers and requires power in
the same direction is proved to be consistent and efficient for the ancillary
services market (cf. [43]).
In conclusion, the bidding problem can be considered as a two-stage
problem. At the first stage the BRP bids on the day-ahead market, where
both day-ahead and AS prices are unknown. At the second stage AS bids
have to be sent, but information on day-ahead prices have been revealed.
The resultant process is schematized in Figure 5.7.
First, based on historical market data and internal portfolio, BRPs bid
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at the Power Exchange. Bids and offers are collected and the PX performs
the clearing process. Public results are disclosed, and sent back to the
BRPs. At this point, an Unit Commitment algorithm estimates a rough
approximation of the power profile needed to comply with the committed
volume, also deciding which plants are to be switched on/off during each
PTU. The Unit Commitment output influences the AS Bidding Algorithm
together with load and wind forecasts. AS bidding curves and requests
are obtained, which again are cleared by the TSO, deciding the amount of
allocated capacity based on demand and offer.
5.3.2 The imbalance system
Any deviation from the scheduled E-Program is considered as imbalance
(see [72]). Imbalances are settled by the TSO, which has previously bought
capacity on the ancillary services market. In the remainder of this section,
all prices and quantities are intended per PTU, and therefore we omit
74
CHAPTER 5. OPTIMAL BIDDING ON ENERGY MARKETS
the time index k. Should the need of regulating power occur, the TSO
sends a control signal to each BRP, based on the received bids. For each
PTU the imbalance prices λ±imb are calculated, which are the prices for
deviations from E-Program. The price λ±imb depends on the AS price and
on the Control State (CS). This value indicates the direction of the system
imbalance and can take the values +1,−1, 0 or 2. If only positive capacity
is required (the system has a power shortage) CS has value +1, while if
the system has a power surplus and only negative capacity is triggered the
CS has value −1. If neither positive nor negative regulating capacity is
required CS has value 0, while if both positive and negative capacity are
required in the same PTU CS is equal to 2. Therefore the imbalance price
is calculated as λ+imb = (1 + a + φ)λ
AS+ in up-regulating mode (CS = 1),
and λ−imb = (1 + a + φ)λ
AS− in down-regulating mode (CS = −1), and
both λ+imb = (1 + a + φ)λ
AS+ and λ−imb = (1 + a + φ)λ
AS− are calculated
in two-sided regulating mode (CS = 2), where φ is a proportional factor.
When the control state is 0, no upward nor downward regulating power is
asked, and λ±imb = 0.
If the system is lacking power, up-regulating reserves are activated
(CS = 1). BRPs causing imbalance (sourcing too much power from the
system), pay their deviation at price λAS+ as far as this deviation is within
the cleared capacity R+i , the power exceeding this quantity is paid at λ
+
imb.
Contrarily, if the system has a power surplus (CS = −1) and the BRP
is injecting too much energy, it will pay the cleared capacity R−i at λ
AS−
and the excess deviation at λ−imb. There are basically three ways the TSO
can handle passive balancing, i.e. causing imbalance that helps the system,
namely:
1. Payment for passive balancing : the BRP pays imbalance costs for
deviating even though the imbalance is actually helping the system;
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2. No payment for passive balancing : the BRP causing imbalance with
opposite sign with expect to the system imbalance is not rewarded
nor penalized;
3. Reward for passive balancing : the BRP receives a reward for helping
the system restore the balance, even though it is deviating from its
schedule.
R-R+ ✏
fc(✏)
(a) Imbalance costs in case of payment for pas-
sive balancing
R-R+ ✏
fc(✏)
imbalance cost 
CS = -1
imbalance cost  
CS = 1
(b) Imbalance costs in case of no payment for
passive balancing
R-R+ ✏
fc(✏)
imbalance cost  
CS = 1
imbalance cost 
CS = -1
(c) Imbalance costs in case of reward for passive
balancing
Figure 5.8: Imbalance costs in the three situations
The three situations are depicted in Figure 5.8. Denoting by i the
imbalance committed by BRP i, the corresponding imbalance payment
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fc(i) in case a is defined by the following set of equations:
fc(i) = min zi (5.4)
zi ≥ −λAS+i (5.5)
zi ≥ −λAS+R+i + λ+imb(R+i − ) (5.6)
zi ≥ −λAS−i (5.7)
zi ≥ −λAS−R−i + λ−imb(R−i − ) (5.8)
with the auxiliary variable zi. In this case, irrespective of the regulation
state, any imbalance is paid at λAS± for the portion not exceeding the
allocated capacity R±i , at λ
±
imb for the remaining part. In situation b the
imbalance cost function fc(i) depends on the regulating state. If CS = 1
then
fc(i) = min zi (5.9)
zi ≥ −λAS+i (5.10)
zi ≥ −λAS+R+i + λ+imb(R+i − i) (5.11)
zi ≥ 0 (5.12)
(5.13)
while if CS = −1
fc(i) = min zi (5.14)
zi ≥ −λAS−i (5.15)
zi ≥ −λAS−R−i + λ−imb(R−i − i) (5.16)
zi ≥ 0 (5.17)
(5.18)
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Finally, in case c the imbalance cost function reads as:
fc(i) = max{−λAS+R+i + λ+imb(R+i − i),min{−λAS+i,−λ+imbi}} (5.19)
with CS = 1 and
fc(i) = max{−λAS−R− + λ−imb(R−i − ),min{−λAS−i,−λ−imbi}}. (5.20)
Of course, in any case prices have to be adjusted in order to guarantee
financial neutrality for the TSO: no profit or loss should come from the
system balancing. This means for example that in case of no payment for
passive balancing, active imbalance must be lower than the total supplied
regulating power because there were BRPs actually helping the system
without being paid for that. Imbalance prices should therefore be lower
because not all the needed regulating capacity has been supplied via AS
reserves. This is achieved by solving a posteriori the equation (at each
PTU k)
NBRP∑
i=1
IAS,i +
NBRP∑
i=1
Iimb,i(γ) = 0 (5.21)
where NBRP is the number of BRPs, IAS,i =
∑NPTUIAS,i(k)
k=1 is the total
income for selling regulating power in real-time, Iimb,i is the total imbalance
cost and γ is a correcting factor. Note that Iimb,i =
∑NPTU
k=1 fc(i, k). In our
framework we choose a combination of situation a and b: neither penalty
nor reward is given for passive balancing in up-regulating mode CS = 1,
while payment for both active and passive balancing is applied in down-
regulating mode CS = −1. This is justified by the considered affine cost
structure: if negative imbalance is not penalized in down-regulating mode,
every BRP will be automatically incentivized to set each generator to the
minimum to save production costs.
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5.3.3 Day-ahead operations
In conclusion, on the day before the execution the BRP has to make deci-
sions on:
1. The bidding curve for the day-ahead auction, intended as a piece-wise
constant curve expressing the minimum required price (e/MWh) for
producing a given power at each hour of the following day, taking into
account uncertainty about AS prices,
2. The AS bidding curves, offering up-regulating and down-regulating
capacity based on the residual capacity allowed by the Unit Com-
mitment and accounting for wind and load stochasticity. This curves
are also formulated as piece-wise constant curves expressing the min-
imum expected reward for increasing/decreasing the power set point
by a MWh.
3. The quantities R+i and R
−
i to request to the market in order to hedge
against imbalances. In our framework the costs for participating to
the double-sided market are set as λR+ = aλAS+ and λR− = aλAS−,
where a ∈ [0.05, 0.15] is a constant deemed as the opinion that the
system has about the possibility of doing imbalance. In other words,
the BRP resulting as requestor pays a fee for allocating AS services.
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Chapter 6
Proposed solutions for bidding on
DA and AS markets
In Section 5.3 we have formalized the main problems to be solved by BRPs
for trading on the energy and AS markets. In this chapter we present the
proposed solutions to cope with those problems. Specifically, in Section
6.1 we present some previous work on optimal bidding, in Section 6.2 we
describe the day ahead strategy, in Section 6.4 the AS bidding approach
is presented. In Section 6.5 experimental results obtained from testing the
proposed market strategies in a simulation environment are reported and
in Section 6.6 some conclusions are drawn with respect to the proposed
approach.
6.1 State of the art
Developing a day-ahead bidding strategy is a complex task, since it re-
quires a careful evaluation of a wide set of variables, both external (prices,
weather forecast), and internal (portfolio,cost structure, risk attitude). It
is not easy to compare the proposed solutions to the current standard prac-
tice. Generally speaking, BRPs with little installed capacity tend to bid
at marginal costs to be competitive, while non price-taker companies have
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own internal bidding strategies that cannot be disclosed. The problem of
composing optimal bidding strategies at the power exchange and capacity
reserves market has been extensively addressed in the literature especially
since the electricity market deregulation. The first works after the market
liberalization typically accounted for two or three predetermined bidding
levels among which to choose (e.g. bid low or bid high) [62, 69]. In [69]
the authors, by means of illustrative examples, apply dynamic program-
ming to formulate optimal bidding problems. The example refer to simple
generating units (hydro, thermal) and show how restrictions on the form
of the curves (for example, non-decreasing conditions) affect the bidding
strategy. Dynamic programming is used to tackle problems where the state
and the dispatch at period k are correlated to the ones at period k + 1,
for example in the case of hydro plants where the level of the reservoir
depends on the dispatch strategy adopted in the previous period and fi-
nal conditions are imposed (example, the reservoir must be empty at the
final period). Numerous works relate to optimization of hydro-power pro-
duction [26, 27, 44]; this is an insightful and interesting problem, where
decisions at each stage heavily affect subsequent steps. The paper [16]
addresses the bidding problem from the perspective of a price-taker ther-
mal producer bidding in the day-ahead market under price uncertainty.
Of course, game theoretical approaches and the determination of the Nash
equilibrium among competing players has always played a role [45, 46]. An
integrated bidding and scheduling algorithm with risk management under
a deregulated market using a combination of Lagrangian relaxation and
stochastic dynamic programming is proposed in [49]. The requested form
of the bidding curves also influences the market strategy. An approach
based on Monte Carlo simulation and Genetic Algorithms where player
bid linear supply curves taking into account rival behavior is shown in [32].
In [35] the authors propose an optimal bidding strategy for thermal and
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generic programming units in the day-ahead market in presence of Virtual
Power Plants (VPP) and bilateral contracts. An heuristic bidding strategy
for buyers and sellers in a continuos double auctions is proposed in [52].
The beneficial effect of having delay tolerant consumers in the portfolio to
cope with renewables uncertainty is described in [61].
An approach similar to the one described in this thesis is used in [29].
The authors propose two different bidding strategies for the PX and the
AS market for suppliers with marginal generating units. At the PX level
the goal is to maximize benefit from trading on both energy markets. If
a unit is dispatched then the supplier can proceed with the selected strat-
egy, otherwise either the generating unit must be shut down leading to
shut-down/switch-on costs, or another bidding strategy for the AS reserve
market should be operated, in order to guarantee the minimum stable out-
put for the unit. An unit commitment problem is then solved in order to
minimize the number of shut-down/switch-on cycles. The framework of
the cited paper is the California market, where the AS auction is cleared
after the PX and suppliers submit linear bid curves. Hence, BRPs must
determine the coefficients of two linear functions (PX and AS) for each
hour of the day.
The BRP day-ahead and AS bidding problems present different con-
ditions. In fact, energy cannot be stored and there is not any particular
restriction imposed to the generators. That is the reason why we chose to
formulate independent stochastic optimization problems for each hour (or
PTU) of the day.
As in [16] the proposed BRP day-ahead bidding strategy selects the op-
timal dispatch corresponding to a price level, and composes the bid curves
interpolating the obtained optimal pairs. The idea behind is the follow-
ing: a BRP with a portfolio of generating units of various types (coal,
thermal, nuclear) aims at maximizing their efficiency, operating them at a
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non-minimum power level. Hence at the day ahead level, when the opti-
mization is still coarse, one plans to keep the generators status steady, in
order to operate them efficiently and to save cycle costs. This is the rea-
son why the day-ahead algorithm considers the operating status ON/OFF
of the plants as fixed. After the definition of the E-Program, the unit
commitment is executed. If the energy assigned during several subsequent
PTUs is near the minimum power level of the plants, then the UC can
decide to shut down one or more costly plants, distributing their sched-
uled production among the other generators. Contrarily, if the assigned
E-Program is close to the upper bound, the UC algorithm could decide to
switch on some plants in order to have them operating for offers to the AS
market. Finally, one hour ahead, when the generator status is fixed (it is
late to change it, since switch on/shut down times can take up to 6 hours)
and uncontrollable production and load is highly predictable, AS bids are
submitted.
6.2 Day-ahead bidding strategy
The first high-level task of a BRP consists of composing offers for the
day ahead market (DAM). Each day BRPs compose and submit offers to
the PX. This activity is crucial for the BRP’s economic equilibrium, and
involves the analysis of several sources of uncertainty. The question a BRP
has to answer to, in order to take the optimal decision, is what amount
of the total production capacity of the generators should be offered to the
PX market, and how much energy, if any, should instead be reserved for
the control reserves market, in order to optimize an economic objective
that can be the pure expected profit or a risk-based index. The bid/offers
submitted by BRPs for the DAM and for the control reserves are in the
form of piecewise constant curves, one for each hour of the following day.
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A BRP owning one or several generators is in general a producer and
hence submits sell orders or shortly called offers (ask). However, it can
also submit buy orders or shortly called bids when market clearing prices
are expected to be so low that it is convenient to buy energy, because
buying is cheaper than producing. Regulating and reserve capacity can
be directed both upwards (feeding energy into the grid) and downwards
(source energy from the grid). Aggregated offers for the PX from all BRPs
constitute the basis for the auction process, whose result is the E-Program,
the bulk schedule for the following day.
The DAM bidding problem can be seen as a two-stage optimization
problem: At the first stage the BRP has to make offers on the day ahead
Market without knowing the ancillary services prices; at the second stage,
once the quantity of energy allocated to the DAM is known, BRP has to
make bids/offers on the ancillary services Market.
The problem of deciding both the energy volume to offer on the mar-
ket and the corresponding price is clearly bilinear1. In order to keep the
problem linear, prices are fixed to some user-defined values and energy
volumes are computed such that they are optimal for the chosen prices (a
similar approach has been taken, e.g., in [26]). Let λPX1 , λ
PX
2 , . . . , λ
PX
N be
the sequence of fixed PX prices. For each λPXp , we generate 2L scenarios
of possible prices for the ancillary services Market λASs , s = 1, 2, . . . , 2L,
constituting the second stage of the optimization problem. Then, the prob-
lem is solved for each of the generated prices λPXp , obtaining the energy
volumes EPXp to offer on the market, with p ∈ 1, 2, . . . , N . Finally, the
1A function is bilinear when it is linear in each of its variables. The simplest example is f(x, y) = xy.
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piecewise constant bid curve is constructed by interpolation as
λ(E) =

λ1 if E1 ≤ E < E2,
λ2 if E2 ≤ E < E3,
...
...
λN−1 if EN−1 ≤ E < EN ,
λN if E = EN .
(6.1)
In order to solve the problem for the PX we assume a price taker point
of view, that is, the considered BRP’s offers do not influence the market
and the BRP accepts any couple (energy, price) decided by the market
on the proposed bidding curve. In the following section the procedure to
generate DAM and ASM price scenarios is described.
6.2.1 Scenario Generation for DAM and ASM prices
A set of N values of expected DAM prices λPX1 , λ
PX
2 , . . . , λ
PX
N are deter-
mined by uniform sampling of the interval of possible prices [0, λPXmax], with
user-defined step size λstep, where λ
PX
max is the maximum price considered in
the DAM supply curve. Note that λPXmax is taken so that the corresponding
energy amount offered on the market is equal to the maximum production
capacity of the BRP.
ancillary services prices are generated based on historical data relat-
ing control energy prices (as differential to the day ahead Market price)
with the system imbalance, provided by TenneT2. This relation, shown
in Figure 6.1, is market driven and appears quite stable and robust over
the years, hence being suitable to be used for modeling purposes. Any
other empirical distribution can be used in the optimization to generate
AS prices. The left side of the graph refers to the case where the mar-
2TenneT is the Dutch TSO since1998
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Figure 6.1: Relation between PX and Control prices (source: TenneT)
ket is short, BRPs sell Energy to the TSO, and the ASM price is higher
than the DAM price. The right side is related to the case where there is
surplus of energy, BRPs buy energy from the TSO, and the ASM price is
below the DAM price. Given an expected DAM price λPXi , a discrete set of
possible ASM prices is inferred from the graph and used in the optimiza-
tion problem. ASM scenario generation yields a set of L downward ASM
prices λAS−1 , λ
AS−
2 , . . . , λ
AS−
L related to the case where there is surplus of
energy so ASM price is lower than DAM price, and a set of L upward prices
λAS+1 , λ
AS+
2 , . . . , λ
AS+
L concerning the case where we expect the market to
be short, so the ASM price is greater than the DAM price. Probabilities of
each considered ASM price, denoted by piAS−1 , . . . , pi
AS−
L , pi
AS+
1 , . . . , pi
AS+
L ,
are also empirically inferred from the graph.
6.2.2 Generators model
In order to construct the bid curve the BRP has to take into account
production costs and efficiency of generators. Since unit commitment is
decided only after that the E-Program has been defined, here we use an
approximate model of generators where the current plants ON/OFF status
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is assumed to be constant for the following day and no start-up and shut-
down costs are considered.
The BRP model includes n controllable generators G1,G2, . . . ,Gn. Max-
imum and minimum power of each generator are defined by Pmax,j and
Pmin,j, respectively, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Efficiency of each generator Ej is de-
fined as
Ej = Mj
(
a2
(
Pj
Pmax,j
)2
+ a1
Pj
Pmax,j
+ a0
)
(6.2)
where a0, a1, a2 are given coefficients, that are dependent on the type
of generator, Mj is the maximum efficiency achievable by the generator,
and Pj is the power set-point. Minimum and maximum energy that can
be produced by each generator Gj in an hour are denoted, respectively, by
Emin,j and Emax,j, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, and are computed as a function of the
power level at the previous PTU and of the ramp rate specifications of
each generator. The cost of producing 1 MW by generator Gj is defined
using (6.2) as
Cj = TCjPj
Mj
(
a2
(
Pj
Pmax,j
)2
+ a1
Pj
Pmax,j
+ a0
) , (6.3)
where Cj is the fuel price in e/MWh and Pj is assumed constant over the
time interval T = 1 [h], j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
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6.2.3 Optimization problem formulation
The optimization problem to be solved for each hour h = 0, 1, . . . , 23, and
for each of the N fixed DAM prices λPXp , p = 1, 2, . . . , N , is formulated as
follows
min `+
1
1− β
(
L∑
s=1
piAS+s [fs − `]+ +
2L∑
s=L+1
piAS−s−L [fi − `]+
)
(6.4a)
s.t. fs =
n∑
j=1
Cjusj
Mj
(
a2,j
(
usj
TPmax,j
)2
+ a1,j
usj
TPmax,j
+ a0,j
) + [λimb,sximb,s]−
− λPXp xPXp − λAS+s xASup,s, s = 1, . . . , L, (6.4b)
fs =
n∑
j=1
Cjusj
Mj
(
a2,j
(
usj
TPmax,j
)2
+ a1,j
usj
TPmax,j
+ a0,j
) + |λimb,sximb,s|
− λPXp xPXp + λAS−s−L xASdo,s−L, s = L+ 1, . . . , 2L, (6.4c)
uj ≤ usj ≤ uj, j = 1, . . . , n, s = 1, . . . , 2L, (6.4d)
n∑
j=1
usj − xPXp − xASup,s = ximb,s, s = 1, . . . , L, (6.4e)
n∑
j=1
usj − xPXp + xASdo,s−L = ximb,s, s = L+ 1, . . . , 2L, (6.4f)
xASdo,s ≤ xPXp , s = 1, . . . , L, (6.4g)
xPXp ≥ 0, (6.4h)
xASup,s ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . , L, (6.4i)
xASdo,s ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . , L. (6.4j)
where T = 1 [h]. The decision variables of the optimization problem are:
• ` ∈ R: variable for CVaR approximation (see Section 2.1.3),
• xPXp ∈ R: energy offered on the day ahead market at price λPXp ,
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• xASup,s ∈ R: energy reserved for the ancillary services Market for upward
direction at price λASup,s, s = 1, 2, . . . , L,
• xASdo,s ∈ R: energy reserved on the ancillary services Market for down-
ward direction at price λASdo,s, s = 1, 2, . . . , L,
• ximb,s ∈ R: estimated energy imbalance for sth scenario, s = 1, 2, . . . , 2L,
• usj ∈ R: energy produced by the jth generator, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, related
to the case where the energy bid on the ASM is xASup,s, if s = 1, 2, . . . L,
or xASdo,s−L, if s = L+ 1, L+ 2, . . . , 2L.
The control parameters that can be used to tune the bidding algorithm
and differentiate the behavior of the BRPs are:
• β ∈ R+: a coefficient modeling BRP’s attitude towards risk. Common
values for β are in the range [0.9, 0.99], where higher values imply a
more conservative approach.
• φ ∈ R+: a penalty term used to derive λimb as λimb = φλAS±. Common
values for φ are in the range [0.05, 0.1], where higher values make the
BRP less likely to generate imbalance.
• λstep ∈ R+: the step size used to generate N DAM energy prices and
construct the piecewise constant bid curve. Common values for λstep
are in the range [1, 20], where smaller values allow for a finer bid curve,
but require more computational load.
Constraints (6.4b)-(6.4c) define the loss function as the difference be-
tween expected production and imbalance costs, and expected profits. Im-
balance costs are modeled as [λimb,sximb,s]
−, for s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} and as
|λimb,sximb,s|, for s ∈ {L+ 1, L+ 2, . . . , 2L}, hence passive balancing is not
rewarded nor penalized in up regulating mode CS = 1, while both pas-
sive and active imbalance are penalized when CS = −1. The estimated
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imbalance price is taken here as a function of the ASM expected price,
namely
λimb,s =
{
(1 + a+ φ)λASup,s if s ∈ {1, . . . , L},
(1 + a+ φ)λASdo,s−L if s ∈ {L+ 1, . . . , 2L},
(6.5)
Constraints (6.4d) impose boundaries on the minimum and maximum en-
ergy production of generators. Constraints (6.4e) and (6.4f) define the
expected energy imbalance, considering that no energy can be stored. Con-
straint (6.4g) prevents the BRP from offering a negative downward capac-
ity.
Problem (6.4) is a nonconvex optimization problem, due to constraints
(6.4b) and (6.4c). In order to solve it, production costs can be approx-
imated by affine or quadratic curves, yielding a convex problem (respec-
tively, a QP or a QCQP). Production costs for generators of BRP #1 and
their affine approximations are shown in Figure 6.2. The overall BRP day
ahead bidding procedure is listed in Algorithm 2. An example of bidding
curve is shown in Figure 6.3.
Algorithm 2 BRP day ahead bidding algorithm
For each hour h ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 23}:
1. Update the estimation of initial power set-points P0 for hour h;
2. Compute minimum and maximum energy uj , uj , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, given the estimated power
set-point P0, the maximum ramp rate and the efficiency curves of each generator;
3. Generate a set of N possible DAM prices λPX1 , λ
PX
2 , . . . , λ
PX
N ;
4. For each fixed DAM price, generate L ASM downward prices λAS−1 , λ
AS−
2 , . . . , λ
AS−
L and
L ASM upward prices λAS+1 , λ
AS+
2 , . . . , λ
AS+
L together with their corresponding probabilities
piAS−1 , . . . , pi
AS−
L , pi
AS
+1 , . . . , pi
AS+
L , and solve the optimization problem (6.4);
5. Build the bidding curve for day d and hour h, according to (6.1).
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Figure 6.2: Production costs (blue, solid line) and affine approximations (red, dashed
line) for BRP #1
6.2.4 Formulation of buy curves on the day ahead market
The algorithm described in the previous section deals with the formulation
of offers to sell the energy produced by the BRP on the DAM. However,
a BRP could also have internal loads that need to be satisfied in order
to fulfill OTC contracts. In this framework, the energy needed to satisfy
such loads, minus possibly available energy from intermittent generation, is
assumed to be bought on the market. Namely, let lh and rˆh be the internal
load and the expected energy production from uncontrollable generation
plants, respectively, at hour h of the considered day. Then, for each hour
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Figure 6.3: day ahead bidding curve obtained from Algorithm 2
of the day h = 0, 1, . . . , 23, a bid is submitted to the DAM in the form of
a price-inelastic curve, where the energy requested is equal to lh − rˆh, at
any price set by the market clearing process. In other words, generation
from renewables is treated as a negative load. Possible imbalances due
to the difference between the expected intermittent generation rˆh and the
real value rh observed at hour h are compensated by trading energy on the
ancillary services Market.
6.3 Unit Commitment
After the market is cleared and E-Program is communicated to every BRP,
a unit commitment algorithm calculates the power schedule for the follow-
ing day. Unit commitment aims to find a cost-minimal schedule and a
production level for each generating unit over time, minimizing operating
and cycle costs while satisfying production constraints and it is usually
formulated as a mixed-integer problem. In this framework unit commit-
ment is solved with well known standard techniques as in [76]. Given n
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thermal (oil, gas, coal) units, let zjh be unit states, i.e. binary decision
variables such that zjh = 1 if the generator j is running at time h, zjh = 0
if the generator is down, and let ujh be the production of unit j at h.
Operating costs consist in fuel costs as described in 6.2.2, we call them
FCj(zjh, ujh), and start-up costs SCjh(ujh). Let T be the time horizon
(UC is often calculated hourly, so T = 24). Denoting by uj = [uj1 . . . ujT ]
T
and uj = [zj1 . . . zjT ]
T respectively the power output and unit status of
each generator over time and defining U = [u1 . . . un] and Z = [z1, . . . , zn],
the objective function reads:
min
U,Z
T∑
h=1
n∑
j=1
FCj(zjh, ujh) + SCjh(ujh) (6.6)
The demand p0h has to be satisfied:
n∑
j=1
ujh ≥ p0h,∀j, h (6.7)
The output of a unit must be zero if the unit is shut down:
zjhuj ≤ ujh ≤ zjhuj,∀j, h (6.8)
Minimum up and down time constraints are imposed to prevent thermal
stress and high maintenance costs. Denoting by τ j the minimum down
time of unit j (in hours),
zjh+τ−1 + zjh−1 − zjh ≤ 1 (6.9)
for all τ = 1, . . . ,min{T−t, τ j−1}. Finally, a reserve margin rh ≥ 0 can be
imposed, to ensure that there is spare production capacity for regulating
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purposes:
N∑
j=1
(zjhuj − ujh) ≥ rh,∀j (6.10)
6.4 Ancillary services bidding strategy
The approach to the AS bidding problem is similar to the day-ahead strat-
egy. A set of AS prices is fixed and the corresponding optimal dispatch
is calculated by solving a scenario based stochastic optimization problem.
The curve is finally interpolated from the resulting points as done in [50].
The main differences with respect to the day-ahead problem stand in the
shorter time horizon: on the AS trade exchange bids can be submitted up
to one hour prior to delivery. This originates some consequences:
• uncertainty on load and wind is reduced,
• the unit commitment is set and cannot be modified: shut down -
switch on times prevent the BRP from taking decision on a short time
horizon,
• the BRP also sends requests for AS.
The stochastic scenarios here model the uncertainty on the intermittent
production profile. Specifically, wind and load are aggregated into a single
curve, where load is considered as a negative uncertain production. At
PTU k the most likely wind scenario is the wind blowing at PTU k − 1,
as suggested by the persistence method, that will be illustrated in section
6.4.2. Based on historical data we generate a set of prosumption scenarios
ξ1, . . . , ξS with corresponding probabilities pi1, . . . , piS.
The AS problem formulation also accounts for price-elastic load, con-
sisting of independent prosumers free to adjust their consumption based
on energy prices. The behavior of this kind of prosumers is described in
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[10]. The load scenarios are modified according to generated prices λASp . If
prosumers are active, they are going to switch off their loads as the price
for ancillary services increases over a certain threshold λload, namely the
contract price. The relation between λdiff = [λ
AS−λload]+ and the load de-
crease is approximately linear. For prices λASp > λload, the load decrement
is subtracted from the stochastic scenarios.
In the following sections the scenario generating methodology is de-
scribed more in detail.
6.4.1 Scenario generation
While computing the AS bidding curve, a series of prosumption scenarios
is generated at each step, built from historical data and determined as
the difference between forecast wind and expected consumption. These
two quantities are non-controllable variables, over which we only have
predictions and wind is considered as “negative load”. Assuming that
the two variables are independent, combining the two kinds of load in a
single grid allows us to build a wide range of possible scenarios. So, if
Lc = {ξc1, . . . , ξcL}, is the set of L possible consumption scenarios, with cor-
responding probability vector Πc = {pic1, . . . , picL}, and Lw = {ξw1 , . . . , ξwW} is
a set of W likely wind production scenarios, with corresponding probability
vector Πw = {piw1 , . . . , piwW}, the set of the possible prosumption scenarios
is given by the cartesian product LC ×LW = {ξ11, . . . , ξLW}, consisting of
L × W elements, and with probability vector Π = {pi11, . . . , piLW}. The
generic element ξij, i = 1, . . . , L, j = 1, . . . ,W is calculated as:
ξij = ξ
w
i − ξcj (6.11)
while the element piij is:
piij = pi
c
ipi
w
j (6.12)
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assuming that the wind and consumption processes are independent. In
the remainder we define S = LW and we use the row-wise linear indexing
so that ξij simply reduces to ξi, i = 1, . . . , S.
6.4.2 Wind
In our problem setting, the method for generating wind scenarios tracks a
technique currently used in practice, called persistence method. The idea
behind is simple: since the prediction horizon is relatively small, we assume
that the wind that is blowing in the current instant will be the same in
one hour. To do so, average wind power data relative to a period of one
year has been collected. The sample time is one PTU. The forecast error
is computed as e(t) = w(t + 4) − w(t), for every PTU of the year, where
w(k) is the average wind power in PTU k. A histogram of the forecast
error collected over one year is shown in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Empirical distribution of one-hour-ahead wind forecast
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Figure 6.5: The price-elastic load
It can be observed that the predominance of the one-hour-ahead forecast
error (more than 95% cases) is contained between −28 and +24 MW in
the whole network.
6.4.3 Price elastic load
The other element forming stochastic scenarios of the AS bidding problem
is the price-elastic load of prosumers. Price-elastic loads are a device that
can be used by BRPs to balance their production internally. When for
example the price for power shortage is very high, a BRP can activate its
prosumers by forwarding them a price signal λload communicating them
to decrease their consumption. Prosumers are characterized by a price
elasticity [e/MWh], that is the parameter by which they regulate their
load, assumed to be known to the BRP. Price elasticity generate short-
term demand response (elastic) function for each PTU, thus implying an
active and indirect participation of prosumers in the AS markets.
The following inputs and parameters are needed to define the prosumers:
1. Pnom,i: the nominal load assigned to each BRP i, this is the maximum
load that BRP i will supply.
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2. λload: a price signal communicated by the BRP to its price-elastic
load to regulate consumption, in our case we assume that this signal
is simply the upward AS market outcome λAS+.
3. λset: the price above which prosumers start to be price sensitive.
4. α: this parameter is expressed in [MW/e] and indicates the sensitivity
of the load with respect to the price.
5. βp: the participation rate of price-elastic prosumers. This parameter
can be set at βp = 1, and incorporated into the price sensitivity.
The load of BRP i in PTU t is calculated by:
Pload,i = max {min{Pnom,i, Pnom,i − α(λload − λset)}, (1− βp)Pnom,i}
(6.13)
The function Pload,i is illustrated in Figure 6.5. In order to introduce
stochasticity in the load we model an additive noise as a gaussian noise
with known mean and variance µload, σload.
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6.4.4 Optimization problem formulation
The resulting optimization problem is as shown in (6.14).
min `+
1
1− β
(
S∑
s=1
pis[fsp − `]+
)
(6.14a)
s.t. fsp = f
1
sp + f
2
sp + f
3
sp + f
4
sp s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14b)
f 1sp =
n∑
j=1
Cjusjp
Mj
(
a2,j
(
usjp
TPmax,j
)2
+ a1,j
usjp
TPmax,j
+ a0,j
)
s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14c)
f 2sp = −λASp xASp , s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14d)
f 3sp = −aλASp xRp , s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14e)
f 4sp ≥ −λASp ximbsp , s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14f)
f 4sp ≥ −λimb,pximbsp + (λimb,p − λASp )xRp , s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14g)
f 4sp ≥ 0, s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14h)
n∑
j=1
usjp − xASp − pPX + ξs − ximbsp = 0, s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14i)
usjp ≥ Pmin,jzjk, j = 1, . . . , n, s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14j)
usjp ≤ Pmax,jzjk, j = 1, . . . , n, s = 1, . . . , S, (6.14k)
λASp x
AS
p ≥ 0 (6.14l)
λASp x
R
p ≤ 0 (6.14m)
xASp ≥ xASp−1. (6.14n)
With xASp0 = −∞. The optimization problem is solved at every PTU
k, k = 1, . . . , 96, once defined the DAM price and E-Program for PTU k
and for a range of P prices λASp (k), p = 1, . . . , P . The value zjk is the unit
commitment status of unit j, zjk = 1 if the unit is on, zjk = 0 if unit j is
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off at PTU k. If λASp (k) ≥ 0 then it is explicitly λAS+, i.e. the system is
lacking energy, it is therefore in up-regulating mode and upward regulating
capacity is required. If λASp (k) < 0 then we are in down regulating mode
(λAS−), downward regulating capacity is required.
The decision variables of the optimization problem at stage k are:
• xASp ∈ R: power bid on the ancillary services market for upward or
downward regulating capacity at price λASp , p = 1, 2, . . . , P . This
variable can be either positive or negative,
• usjp ∈ R: energy produced by the jth generator, j = 1, 2, . . . , n in
scenario i, s = 1, . . . , S at price p, p = 1, . . . , P .
• xRp is the amount of activated external AS capacity with price p,
• ximbsp is the imbalance done in scenario s with price p.
Therefore, each problem has S(n+1)+2 decision variables. At the end, the
P xASp decision variables are aggregated into one single bid curve for PTU k
and the P xRp into two values: upward and downward capacity requests R
+
i
and R−i . Those values are obtained taking the average value over positive
(for down-regulating request R−i ) and negative (for up-regulating request
R+i ) values. Constraints (6.14b) define the loss function as the sum of four
components: f 1 are production costs ((6.14c)), f 2 is the revenue from AS
market ((6.14d)), f 3 represent costs for allocating capacity ((6.14e)), f 4
are imbalance costs, defined by constraints (6.14f), (6.14g) and (6.14h).
Constraints (6.14k) and (6.14j) impose boundaries on the minimum and
maximum power production of generators. Constraints (6.14i) enforce in-
ternal balance and avoid energy storage. Constraints (6.14l)-(6.14m) bind
the algorithm to bid a positive amount of energy and ask a negative one
if the price is positive, and vice versa. Constraint (6.14n) ensures non
decreasing condition.
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A bid curve for upward regulating capacity obtained with this method
is depicted in Figure 6.6. The blue line represents the offer curve, the green
dotted line is the request of approximately 40 MWh.
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Figure 6.6: Upward regulating capacity bid of BRP 1 in PTU 1
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6.5 Case study
In E-Price a simulation environment has been developed to test the de-
vised algorithms. The simulation framework is used to verify theoretical
options for the future operation of the power system. These theoretical op-
tions have been implemented as algorithms describing market operation,
BRP operation and TSO operation. The model framework is such that
it can incorporate the algorithms and test them based on different input
data sets. As the multiple algorithms have parameters for tuning their
behavior, combinations of algorithms and parameters have been chosen
to reduce the number of required experiments while covering a variety of
realistic options. The BRP DA and AS bidding algorithms have been im-
plemented and tested in MATLAB R2009b on a MacBook Pro 2.4 GHz
and 4 GB RAM using Yalmip and CPLEX 12.4. In order to assess the
validity and usefulness of the results the simulation framework has to rep-
resent the current system as accurately as possible. However, there are
many limitations:
• Model validity: as much accurate a model can be, it will never be able
to include all the complex set of variables, parameters and human de-
cisions forming a power grid. In particular, the BRP behavior is not
always well known. Real bidding is often a mix of human actions
and several combined algorithms, therefore a comparison between the
devised BRP algorithms and real-life practice is not realistically pos-
sible.
• Model complexity: some simplifying assumptions have to be made
in order to limit the software complexity. In particular, storage is
not contemplated and congestion management (i.e. behavior in pres-
ence of a tie-line overflow) is treated in another dedicated simulation
framework.
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Unit Cost (e/GJ) Unit Cost (e/MWh)
Gas 5, 36 19, 29
Coal 2, 65 9, 4
Nuclear 0, 83 2, 98
Furnace Gas 1, 00 3, 6
Biomass 3, 32 11, 95
Table 6.1: Fuel costs
a2 a1 a0
Gas turbine −0, 5128 1, 359 0, 1538
Combine cycle gas turbine −0, 4817 0, 991 0, 4907
Other (Coal, Nuclear, PCP) −0, 3952 0, 7622 0, 6325
Integrated gasification combined cycle −0, 7901 1, 3902 0, 3885
Table 6.2: Efficiency curves coefficients
• Time frame: still for complexity issues the simulation period is set at
24 hours. This time horizon allows us to assess the main performance
indexes of the implemented models and algorithms and to test the
correct functioning of the virtual power grid, but a more detailed
analysis about the economic long-run performance of BRPs is not
possible.
The parameters composing the physical model of the power network have
been provided by KEMA. With reference to the Dutch electricity market,
we consider a system consisting of 7 BRPs, with different generating assets
and loads. Thermal plants are fueled with gas, coal, nuclear energy, fur-
nace gas and biomass. Unit production costs in e/GJ and e/MWh and
efficiency curve parameters as described in 6.2.2 are reported in Tables 6.1
and 6.2.
In this thesis, we will focus on the main simulation results related to
BRPs management. A complete analysis of the results obtained from the
simulations are the scope of the project report [21]. Although as stated
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above, an objective comparison of the E-Price BRP behavior and real-
life management is not possible, some observations and remarks are done
with respect to the double-sided market arrangement and the proposed
algorithms.
6.5.1 Input data
The E-Price project has a strong focus on ancillary services and particularly
on primary and secondary reserves. One of the main goals of the project
is to be able to efficiently deal with imbalances in real time. Different data
sets were designed to study:
• the impact of a plant trip;
• the effect of wind and load uncertainty;
• the impact of a bigger penetration of renewable sources.
To this aim, 5 input data sets have been proposed, each differing from
the other for more or less dramatic wind fluctuations, presence of elastic
prosumers, plant trips. In this thesis we neglect the data set with plant
trips, as it mostly concerns the ability of a BRP to recover from a sudden
power shortage, and is therefore beyond the scope of this thesis.
For each of the 23 wind farm locations, wind power measurements were
selected and addressed to the individual locations. The wind power val-
ues originate from wind speed measurements available within KEMA. The
wind speed data consist of hourly values for one year (from June 1st 2004
until May 31st 2005) and correspond to 24h ahead prediction errors for
multiple locations in the Netherlands. For each of the locations, the wind
speed time series have been transformed into power time series using a
power curve and consequently this has been interpolated to obtain sec-
ond based values. Two different power curves are generated, with different
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nominal capacities of 2230MW and 10000MW respectively, to test different
amount of wind penetration. For the selected day the wind profiles for the
multiple locations look as in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7: Generated wind power for the 23 wind locations in the Netherlands
Other input data relevant for the simulation are:
• Load signal: a 15 minute load signal is obtained from measurements
of a selected day in 2010;
• Load prediction: a simple load prediction is performed to create an
expected load signal to use for the day ahead market clearing. Devia-
tions between prediction and actual signal therefore results in system
imbalance.
• Market data: data consisting of clearing volumes and prices of energy
exchanged on the DAM for each hour of the day and each day of the
year 2010 were provided by APX3. APX also provided historical delta
prices for 2010 Dutch market, i.e., time series of the difference between
energy market clearing price on the Exchange market and energy price
on the corresponding ancillary services market operated by the TSO.
3APX is an independent fully electronic exchange for anonymous trading on the spot market www.
apxgroup.com
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• Wind realized and forecast power: the realized wind power over the
year, sampled at a frequency of one minute, serves as a basis for the
scenario generation in the day-ahead and ancillary services algorithms.
The input data sets relevant for the simulations differ for:
• perfect/imperfect wind forecast: to test the impact of wind un-
certainty, see Figure 6.8. The red line represents the forecast, the
blue line is the realized wind power. In the simulated case studies,
when forecast is realistic (i.e. imperfect) the wind power realization
is higher than expected during the whole time horizon;
• large/medium wind power production: to verify the influence of
higher renewables penetration.
Parameters and market design at the system level differ for:
• single sided/double sided ancillary services market (current vs
E-Price situation);
• low/high system risk attitude a.
Tunable parameters at individual (BRP) level are:
• internal risk attitude β;
• step size λstep.
For simplicity, a fixed value for the parameter λstep is set for each BRP,
so this is not considered as a tunable parameter. The only requirement
is that λstep is small enough to guarantee sufficient granularity to the bid-
ding curve, so λstep = 5 e or λstep = 10 e. Performance metrics used to
evaluate the algorithms in the various case studies are production costs,
net profit and price volatility. In the next sections we report the main
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(a) Forecast and realized wind power with
perfect forecast
(b) Forecast and realized wind power with
realistic forecast
Figure 6.8: Wind power realization and forecast
simulation results in relation to the different data sets and tunable param-
eters. Since the applied day-ahead strategy is the same in both the E-Price
and benchmark solution, only the results related to ancillary services are
reported.
6.5.2 Risk attitude β
We start our analysis by observing how the bidding behavior of a single
BRP changes in relation to the internal risk attitude β in the double-sided
situation. The value beta is a CVaR related parameter defined in section
2.1.3, which is used in the bidding problem formulations (6.4) and (6.14).
This parameter is generally set at standard values 90%, 95% or 99%. In
general, any value from 50% to 99% can be used. If β = 90% then VaR
is the lowest value lβ such that P [f(u, s) ≤ l] ≥ 90%, and CVaR is the
expectation over that interval. An increase in β to, for example, 99% should
lead to a more conservative behavior since now it is asked P [f(u, s) ≤ l] ≥
99%. Table 6.3 confirms this expectation. The table reports the couples
price-volume composing the upward regulating AS bidding curves of BRP1
in the first PTU. BRP 1 consists of 8 CCGT plants fueled with gas, 1 coal
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plants and 1 biomass generator. The first column contains the fixed grid
of prices, the other two columns the optimal dispatched volume at that
price respectively with β = 0.92 and β = 0.99. Bid curves are expressed in
energy (MWh) and we have chosen λstep = 5 e.
Price [e] Offered volume β = 0.92 [MWh] Offered volume β = 0.99 [MWh]
5 0 0
10 0 0
15 0 0
20 0 0
25 0 0
30 0 0
35 0 0
40 74.7802 72.2767
45 78.3879 75.8844
50 79.6396 75.8844
55 79.6396 77.1362
60 79.6396 77.1362
65 79.6396 77.1362
70 79.6396 77.1362
75 79.6396 77.1362
80 80.8913 77.1362
85 80.8913 77.1362
90 80.8913 77.1362
95 80.8913 77.1362
100 80.8913 77.1362
Request −38.3751 −40.3636
Table 6.3: AS up-regulating bidding curve with different risk attitude β
We can observe that with a higher value of β, a lower volume is offered at
the same price. The requested volume is higher, confirming the expectation
of more conservative behavior with high risk parameter β: the BRP offers
less energy and requires for the allocation of more regulating capacity to
avoid real time imbalances.
When the parameter a, modeling the system risk attitude is varying,
the effect can be seen mostly on the request value, while the supply curve
is basically unvaried: it is natural that a low price for capacity allocation
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leads a BRP to request higher amounts of reserves. Optimal couples of the
supply curve and request values are shown in Table 6.4.
Price [e] Offered volume a = 0.1 [MWh] Offered volume a = 0.2 [MWh]
5 0 0
10 0 0
15 0 0
20 0 0
25 0 0
30 0 0
35 0 0
40 73.6817 73.6817
45 77.6215 77.1617
50 78.5411 78.3112
55 79.0010 78.5411
60 79.0010 78.7711
65 79.2309 79.0010
70 79.2309 79.0010
75 79.4608 79.0010
80 79.4608 79.0010
85 79.4608 79.2309
90 79.4608 79.2309
95 79.4608 79.2309
100 79.4608 79.2309
Request −47.7236 −38.6379
Table 6.4: AS up-regulating bidding curve with different system risk attitude a and
β = 0.95
In order to limit the number of tested case studies, in the simulation
environment the BRP internal risk attitude has been determined at the
beginning, and remains constant for the whole set of case studies. The
BRP risk parameters β are reported in Table 6.5.
6.5.3 The single-sided and double-sided markets
In this section we compare the devised algorithms with the identified bench-
mark, that is, when only supply curves can be offered to the AS market.
The economic social benefit obtained with the introduction of double sided
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BRP 1 BRP 2 BRP 3 BRP 4 BRP 5 BRP 6 BRP 7
β 0.95 0.95 0.925 0.95 0.9 0.9 0.9
Table 6.5: Risk attitude β for the 7 BRPs
(a) AGC set-points and boundaries for the
single-sided market
(b) AGC set-points and boundaries for the
double-sided market
Figure 6.9: AGC set-points for the benchmark and E-Price situations, with perfect wind
forecast
ancillary services is investigated.
Let us look at Figure 6.9, referring to perfect wind forecast conditions
(i.e. there is perfect match between the 24 hours ahead wind forecast and
the realized wind production) and a = 0.1. The x-axis indicates time (in
seconds), the y-axis power (in MW). The red line represents the AGC signal
(i.e. the request for secondary control) transmitted in real time by the TSO
to BRPs. It matches the PACE (Processed Area Control Error), that is
proportional to the difference between the scheduled E-Program and the
energy actually present on the grid. The orange lines (in both subfigures)
are the total accumulated energy bids. In Figure 6.9(b) the green lines
are the cleared AS quantities. Note that in the interval [1 × 104, 2 × 104]
cumulative downward bids are barely higher than 500 MW, this indicates
that all BRP are approaching their minimum power level and that they
cannot offer downward regulating capacity to the market.
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We can observe that, being the compared data sets the same, the AGC
requests are very similar, as the imbalances derive from the same wind and
load realizations and they have the same magnitude.
It should be observed that in perfect forecast conditions, the Processed
Area Control Error (PACE) is mainly due to the fact that the Netherlands
are not an isolated power system, but they exchange power with neighbor-
ing countries. In this particular setting, the large amount of wind realized
allows to export several MWs of active power. The sharp steps in the
X-border schedule (energy exchanged with neighboring countries), can be
observed in Figure 6.10. In particular, before 2×104 s the schedule presents
(a) X-border trade in the single-sided sit-
uation
(b) X-border trade in the E-Price situa-
tion
Figure 6.10: X-border exchange schedule and realized production with neighboring coun-
tries
a sharp droop that might cause imbalances and frequency deviations.
The most important aspect to note here is that, except for unexpected
big fluctuations (highlighted by the steep jumps in the AGC curve) almost
all deviations are covered by the negotiated AS power. This energy has
already been reserved and there is no need to call for the imbalance set-
tlement. BRPs deviating from their contracted E-Program (even though
slightly since we are in perfect forecast conditions) are able to cover for
most imbalances by means of their own internal regulating capacity or of
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(a) AGC set-points and boundaries for the
single-sided market
(b) AGC set-points and boundaries for the
double-sided market
Figure 6.11: AGC set-points for the benchmark and E-Price situations, with imperfect
wind forecast
their purchased reserve, that has a lower value than the imbalance price.
Note that cleared downward reserves (R−) in Figure 6.9(b) are generally
lower than upward cleared reserves (R+). This phenomenon is explained
by the affine cost structure used in this framework. In fact a BRP will
always prefer recurring (if available) to its own downward controllable pro-
duction, implying saving costs, than buying that capacity on the market.
This makes the cumulative downward capacity request R− lower than the
upward request R+.
Analogous remarks can be made in case of imperfect forecast, as shown
in Figure 6.11. In this case, the AGC request highlighted by the red line
tends towards negative values, this is explained by the sign of the mis-
match between forecast and realized wind, which is always negative over
the simulation period (more wind than expected blows in the system). As
a consequence, also negative requests R− are more relevant, BRPs are all
experiencing a power surplus and require downward regulating capacity on
the AS market to avoid imbalances.
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Production costs
Production costs reflect overall efficiency: day ahead energy market strate-
gies, AS market architecture and BRP AS market bidding, and real time
BRP control. An efficient market architecture should select the cheapest
assets to produce energy and regulating power, that is, production costs
should be minimized. Therefore, production costs reflect the social welfare
of the system. Table 6.6 reports production costs for the examined data
sets in single-sided and double sided situation. System risk attitude is set
a = 0.1. The first column describes the input data set, more specifically
Data Set / market Single-sided (e) Double-sided (e) ∆DS−SS
perfect + medium 1.829.144 1.829.245 101
perfect + large 1.651.814 1.642.345 −9.469
imperfect + medium 1.758.381 1.757.093 −1.288
imperfect + large 1.601.725 1.601.053 −672
Table 6.6: Production costs in SS and DS with system risk attitude a = 0.1
the first term indicates the type of forecast (perfect vs imperfect) the sec-
ond refers to the wind amount (medium vs large). We can observe that
costs have basically not changed. The same can be said when the system
risk attitude a is increased from 0.1 to 0.2 (see Table 6.7).
Data Set / market Single-sided (e) Double-sided (e) ∆DS−SS
perfect + medium 1.829.144 1.828.477 −667
perfect + large 1.651.814 1.640.669 −11.145
imperfect + medium 1.758.381 1.756.676 −1.705
imperfect + large 1.601.725 1.600.652 −1.073
Table 6.7: Production costs in SS and DS with system risk attitude a = 0.2
The simulation results suggest that the introduction of the double sided
AS markets only affects approximately 0.6% of the total costs (around
10.000 Euros per day for the whole NL). The fact that the total social
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welfare of the system has almost not changed indicates that all the con-
sidered solutions are comparably efficient with respect to this performance
metrics. The bidding strategies used in the simulations were cost reflective
(no market power consideration has been taken into account), and the ob-
tained solutions have converged to (or close to) the optimal working point
in terms of the social welfare. It is interesting and important to observe
that the benefit of hedging against the risk were not paid by an increase
in the total system costs. One would expect that the forward risk hedg-
ing would imply some additional costs that however did not show up in
the simulations. Increasing the system risk attitude leads in each data set
to a slight (almost negligible) increment in production costs, suggesting
that with higher imbalance costs BRPs lean more on their controllable
production than on the more expensive external capacity allocation.
Net profit
The net profit of a BRP i is given by:
Πi = IPX,i + IAS,i − Iimb,i + Iload,i − Ifuel,i (6.15)
The term IPX,i is the income from PX trade, i.e. earnings on the day ahead
market, IAS,i is the income/cost deriving from AS trade (it can comprise
allocating capacity and activation costs in double-sided markets), Iimb,i
are imbalance costs and Ifuel,i are fuel costs. Finally, Iload,i is the rev-
enue coming from load contracts with external consumers. In the devised
framework, BRPs only own production assets and no consumption units.
So, they get earnings from trading energy on the spot and AS markets,
while the demand is simply forwarded from external loads to the markets
via BRP, who have no direct cost or earning from this transaction.
The asymmetry between production and load, together with the signif-
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Data Set Market BRP 1 BRP 2 BRP 3 BRP 4 BRP 5 BRP 6 BRP 7 SUM
perf/med
SS 2.080.836 1.897.928 1.033.399 1.948.894 744.275 210.003 658.544 8.573.879
DS a = 0.1 2.051.799 1.871.987 1.034.514 1.963.184 746.662 217.103 690.180 8.575.428
DS a = 0.2 2.028.659 1.853.546 1.040.602 1.972.723 743.700 218.626 714.977 8.572.834
perf/lar
SS 1.934.527 2.157.764 1.217.031 2.138.469 757.369 313.767 663.531 9.182.460
DS a = 0.1 1.947.628 2.115.706 1.227.036 2.148.042 772.623 309.569 696.071 9.216.676
DS a = 0.2 1.943.257 2.081.741 1.228.518 2.146.340 790.270 320.975 716.395 9.227.496
imp/med
SS 2.143.775 1.912.602 962.444 1.927.196 751.416 177.970 665.872 8.541.276
DS a = 0.1 2.134.444 1.888.556 968.782 1.936.227 751.621 175.433 691.706 8.546.768
DS a = 0.2 2.123.283 1.871.619 974.708 1.940.503 749.915 174.054 710.326 8.544.408
imp/lar
SS 2.309.520 1.890.993 942.587 2.148.908 812.897 127.938 712.383 8.945.226
DS a = 0.1 2.253.194 1.870.887 964.994 2.174.450 821.889 149.201 751.821 8.986.438
DS a = 0.2 2.291.429 1.833.081 936.824 2.156.387 835.350 138.214 789.845 8.981.129
Table 6.8: Net profit of BRPs, all values expressed in e
icant X-border trade depicted in Figure 6.10 explains why the net profit of
BRPs does not sum up to zero. In fact, one could expect that the overall
net profit of BRPs is approximately zero, i.e. there are some BRPs sell-
ing energy and others buying. However, since BRPs do not actually own
consumption units, they only gain a profit from the sales on the power
exchange. We can imagine of a big additional BRP comprising all the na-
tional load who collects the day-ahead bulk demand and forwards it to the
market. From Table 6.8, we observe in all case studies a slight increase of
the overall net profit when passing to the double-sided market, even though
some BRPs earn less, like BRPs 1 and 2. An increase in the system risk
attitude a leads to a slight reduction in the profit, as BRPs act in a more
conservative way.
Price volatility
Price volatility is an important indicator of the market design quality. In
this section, the final AS prices are qualitatively compared in the single-
sided and in the double-sided market design. We compare AS prices in
perfect forecast conditions and medium wind power size, respectively in
single-sided and double-sided market. AS prices per PTU are shown in
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Figure 6.12(a)-(b). The conclusions are the following:
• Prices in the double-sided markets are in general less volatile , with
less sudden sharp peaks;
• Prices for the upward AS provision seem to be higher in the double-
sided AS;
• Prices for the downward AS provision are much smaller in the double-
sided AS.
The first statement is easily explained by the clearing process of double-
sided markets, operated one hour prior to delivery. While in the single-
sided market the price is determined by the last activated bid in real time,
in the double-sided situation the price is a function of the total allocated
capacity, which is more or less constant over one hour. The same fact also
explains the higher prices in the double-sided market: not all the allocated
capacity will be used in real time, so it is natural that the clearing point
is higher than in the corresponding single-sided situation, where only the
needed energy is called in real-time. Moreover, the correcting factor a
and the imbalance penalty φ makes this difference even stronger. The
latter point can be explained by the BRP strategies, i.e., by the fact that
BRPs assume that it is always cheaper to reduce own power set-points
in case of overproduction than to have other BRPs reducing production
in their place. Therefore, the requests (volumes) for downward regulation
on the double-sided markets are small, and consequently, the clearing AS
downward price is also small.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the day ahead and ancillary services bidding problems on
double-sided markets have been addressed. These are delicate and risky
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(a) Price development in the single-sided
market
(b) Price development in the double-sided
market
Figure 6.12: Price development
tasks, because energy prices are extremely volatile and no energy storage
device is present in the Dutch grid to absorb price shocks. Moreover,
the coupling between markets requires an even more attentive operation
planning, since the energy sold on the day ahead market cannot be used
for other purposes.
The E-Price solution is thoroughly designed to tackle the risk borne by
BRPs and to support them in the decision making process. A scenario-
based algorithm is devised in both cases where a linear stochastic problem
is solved at every time unit (hour or PTU), to build the piecewise constant
bid curve. A risk measure CVaR is minimized, in a way that reduces
the risk of the BRP incurring great losses. Operating constraints such as
minimum and maximum power set-points, ramp rate limits and internal
balancing are satisfied.
The most important feature of E-Price bidding curves is the introduction
of AS request quantities. These confidence intervals allow the system to be
prepared to possible imbalances and react promptly.
The main concluding remarks can be synthesized as follows:
• The proposed scenario based optimization approach is suitable for the
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optimal bidding problems, it helps the BRP hedge against the risk and
it reflects the BRP risk attitude, modulated through the parameter
β;
• Applying double-sided AS has comparable fuel usage compared with
single-sided AS, while it still allows BRPs to hedge their risks for being
in imbalance;
• Applying double-sided AS slightly increases BRP income compared
with SSAS (in most cases);
• Applying a larger value for the system risk a slightly decreases the
BRP profit (in most cases);
• Applying double-sided AS leads to less volatile prices and to the allo-
cation of the necessary regulating capacity beforehand.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future developments
After the deregulation of electricity supply, financial and electricity con-
tracts can be traded in a similar way. Nevertheless, there are still major
differences between the traditional stock market and the electricity market
like lacking liquidity, high volatility and jumps, non-normal distributions;
deriving from special characteristics of electricity like the non-storability
and the transmission constraints.
In this thesis we have provided novel stochastic optimization approaches
to trade assets on financial and energy markets. In the first part we have
formulated the dynamic option hedging problem under a stochastic model
predictive control viewpoint. A minimum variance criterion is used to
minimize expected hedging error at each trading instant, where a pricing
engine (generally based on Monte Carlo simulations) is available to predict
future option prices. Numerical tests are carried out on a European call, a
Napoleon cliquet and a barrier call option. The proposed tool can handle
a wide variety of payoff functions and multiple assets and showed good
performance compared to the traditional delta hedging especially when
applied to exotic options. The SMPC approach has been then extended
to the case of transaction costs. The minimum variance criterion has been
proven to be not suitable to handle this type of market, therefore three
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alternative risk measures have been introduced respectively based on a
combination of quadratic error and variance, a CVaR related index and a
min-max approach. The SMPC algorithm has been proven to be effective
when applied to exotic options (barrier). It can be used online by financial
institutions to define an hedging strategy as a support system for traders,
or for the oﬄine quantification of the expected hedging error given some
market hypothesis. The work can be extended to other types of exotic
options and payoffs, and to those options which are not at-the-money, that
is, when the market does not deem the two future opposite situations of
the price going up and the price going down as equally likely and as a
consequence, the strike price is fixed below or above the current market
price.
In the second part of this thesis, the day ahead and ancillary services bid-
ding on electricity markets have been addressed. We have first described
the current market design and the proposed alternative architecture de-
vised in the E-Price project, based on the concept of double-sided auction
for ancillary services. Unlike stock markets, uncertain variables in the elec-
tricity markets can not be approximated by Gaussian curves, and one has
often to resort to empirical distribution functions.
A two-stage stochastic optimization approach based on CVaR minimiza-
tion has then been presented for the optimal bidding on sequential energy
markets. The first stage decision variables are given by the bidding curves
to be submitted on the day ahead auction, at 12.00 of the day before de-
livery in the form of non-decreasing piecewise constant curves. Stochastic
variables at this stage are the prices for secondary control which will be
public only a few minutes before delivery (or weeks later in some cur-
rent market arrangements). The second stage decision variables, to be
taken after the disclosure of spot prices, are the bidding curves for the
double-sided ancillary services market. Here the uncertain variable is the
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amount of energy produced by renewable sources with low marginal costs
but high volatility and thus liable to cause imbalance costs. The right
balance between request and supply has to be chosen, taking into account
unit commitment constraints and price-elastic loads. The E-Price solution
is thoroughly designed to tackle the risk borne by BRPs and to support
them in the decision making process. A scenario-based algorithm is devised
in both cases where a linear stochastic problem is solved at every time unit
(hour or PTU), to build the piecewise constant bid curve. A risk measure
CVaR is minimized, in a way that reduces the risk of the BRP incurring
great losses. Operating constraints such as minimum and maximum power
set-points, ramp rate limits and internal balancing are satisfied.
The algorithms developed in E-Price have been tested in a simulation
environment. The double-sided market architecture for ancillary services
has proven to be a valid alternative to the single-sided current benchmark,
as it decreases control effort by the TSO and allows the system to react
promptly to power imbalances without increasing production costs due to
the hedging option. The BRP algorithms presented in this thesis help the
BRP hedge against the risk and reflect the BRP risk attitude.
Of course, there are many directions for the extension and future devel-
opment of this work. First, many simplifying hypothesis have been made
in order to improve tractability, like sequential markets and the hypoth-
esis of independence between the load and wind production. If extended
to integrated markets, the bidding problems on day-ahead and ancillary
services auctions should be treated jointly also with unit commitment as
a three-stage stochastic optimization problem. The size of such problem
would rise consistently and decomposition techniques would be needed.
Also, the spatial distribution of the demand and the related congestion
problems have been disregarded. In reality, the market behavior of a BRP
can change consistently when it can anticipate congestion of some lines of
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the grid. Generating companies operating in highly congested systems can
exercise a strong market power. A game theoretical approach could be
used to find the equilibrium conditions in such market, where BRPs make
assumptions on their rivals reaction to price or power set-points changes.
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Appendix A
Dynamic hedging based on
mixed-integer programming
Piecewise affine transaction costs as in (4.19) can be also handled by intro-
ducing binary variables. Let xu(t) , u(t − 1) ∈ Rn be the composition of
the portfolio immediately before trading at time t and introduce auxiliary
variables δi(t) ∈ {0, 1}
[δi(t) = 1]↔ [ui(t)− xui (t) ≥ 0] (A.1)
and qi(t) ∈ R
qi(t) =
{
ui(t)− xui (t) if δi(t) = 1
0 otherwise
(A.2)
By using the so-called “big-M” technique, (A.1) can be translated into
the mixed-integer linear inequalities
ui(t)− xui (t) ≥ −Mi(1− δi(t)) (A.3a)
ui(t)− xui (t) ≤ Miδi(t)−  (A.3b)
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and (A.2) into
qi(t) ≤ ui(t)− xui (t) +Mi(1− δi(t)) (A.4a)
qi(t) ≥ ui(t)− xui (t)−Mi(1− δi(t)) (A.4b)
qi(t) ≤ Miδi(t) (A.4c)
qi(t) ≥ −Miδi(t) (A.4d)
where Mi is an upperbound on |ui(t)−xui (t)|, that is the maximum allowed
asset reallocation, and  > 0 is a small scalar (e.g., the machine precision).
Eq. (4.18) can be therefore interpreted as the evolution of a hybrid dy-
namical system, that is expressed in the following mixed logical dynamical
(MLD) form [7]
w(t+ 1) = (1 + r)
(
u0(t)−
n∑
i=1
qi(t)− 2(ui(t)− xui (t))
)
+
n∑
i=1
si(t+ 1)ui(t) (A.5a)
xu(t+ 1) = u(t) (A.5b)
s.t. (A.3), (A.4) (A.5c)
with states w(t), xu(t), input u(t), auxiliary vector δ(t) = [δ1(t) . . . δn(t)]
′ ∈
{0, 1}n of binary variables, and vector q(t) = [q1(t) . . . qn(t)]′ ∈ Rn of aux-
iliary continuous variables. Note that, from a system theoretical viewpoint,
transaction costs introduce a unit delay (A.5b) in the dynamics, due to the
additional state variable xu(t).
By using the stochastic hybrid dynamical model (A.5c), problem (4.26)
can be recast as a mixed-integer quadratic programming (MIQP) problem
(see [7] for details) to be minimized with respect to vector u(t) ∈ Rn, for
which very efficient solvers are available [34, 40]. See also [30] for a related
approach. For options involving a single stock, the number n of assets is
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usually very small (n = 1 or n = 2), so that the minimum variance problem
with transaction costs can be solved also by enumerating the possible 2n
instances of vector δ(t) (that is, in system theoretical terms, by transform-
ing the MLD dynamics (A.5c) into an equivalent piecewise affine (PWA)
form [4] and enumerating the “modes” of the resulting PWA dynamics)
and by solving the corresponding quadratic programs (QP) (4.17) subject
to ui(t) ≥ xui (t) if the corresponding δi(t) = 1, or ui(t) ≤ xui (t) if δi(t) = 0,
for all i = 1, . . . , n.
While the method of Section 4.5.1 is in general more efficient from a nu-
merical viewpoint, in that it completely avoids introducing integer variables
to handle proportional transaction costs, the MIQP method of this section
is more general, for example it can be easily extended to handle transaction
costs of the form hi(ui(t) − ui(t − 1)) = min{c0, isi(t)|ui(t) − ui(t − 1)|},
where c0 is a given minimum fixed cost to be paid in each transaction.
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